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Message-Id: <1497915397-93805-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:36:18 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/23] vfs: copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user()
From: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
The mnt_id field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to
use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed
since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation.
This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
fs/fhandle.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
index 58a61f55e0d0..46e00ccca8f0 100644
--- a/fs/fhandle.c
+++ b/fs/fhandle.c
@@ -68,8 +68,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path,
} else
retval = 0;
/* copy the mount id */
- if (copy_to_user(mnt_id, &real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id,
- sizeof(*mnt_id)) ||
+ if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id, mnt_id) ||
copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
sizeof(struct file_handle) + handle_bytes))
retval = -EFAULT;
--
2.7.4
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