Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 20:41:34 -0400
From: Theodore Ts'o <>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <>,
	LKML <>,,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <>,
	David Miller <>,
	Eric Biggers <>,
	Herbert Xu <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the
 RNG is ready before using

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
> dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
> from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
> isn't relevant in assessing this.

The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is
dependent on that commit landing, correct?  (Order matters, because
otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect
and causing their kernel to deadlock during the boot while they are
trying to track down an unreleated problem.)

       	  	     		   - Ted

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.