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Message-ID: <CAHmME9prHVM+faDB61hQUSa9crSQqmLysWmTakf=9WcUyWwq4A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 02:31:23 +0200
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for
32-bit lock random
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 2:25 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
> There's a bigger problem here, which is that cifs_lock_secret is a
> 32-bit value which is being used to obscure flock->fl_owner before it
> is sent across the wire. But flock->fl_owner is a pointer to the
> struct file *, so 64-bit architecture, the high 64-bits of a kernel
> pointer is being exposed to anyone using tcpdump. (Oops, I'm showing
> my age; I guess all the cool kids are using Wireshark these days.)
>
> Worse, the obscuring is being done using XOR. How an active attacker
> might be able to trivially reverse engineer the 32-bit "secret" is
> left as an exercise to the reader. The bottom line is if the goal is
> to hide the memory location of a struct file from an attacker,
> cifs_lock_secret is about as useful as a TSA agent doing security
> theatre at an airport. Which is to say, it makes the civilians feel
> good. :-)
High five for taking the deep dive and actually reading how this all
works. Nice bug!
> Not waiting
> for the CRNG to be fully initialized is the *least* of its problems.
The kernel is vast and filled with tons of bugs of many sorts. On this
reasoning, maybe I should spend my time auditing web apps instead,
which are usually the "front door" of bugs? I like the puzzles of
random.c. I also had a real world need for wait_for_random_bytes() in
a module I'm writing.
But anyway, your general point is a really good one. Tons of callers
of the random functions are doing it wrong in one way or another.
Spending time looking at those is probably a good idea...
> Anyway, I'll include this commit in the dev branch of the random tree,
> since it's not going to make things worse.
Great, thanks.
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