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Message-ID: <CAHmME9oGBpm=nBuDnSoVBg1A9BMvmR_9EpWE9nH6xoJONZv_fQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 03:03:38 +0200 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, David Safford <safford@...ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 2:50 AM, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 2:31 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote: >> I'm guessing you changed key_alloc_serial() to return an int back when >> you were thinking that you might use get_random_bytes_wait(), which >> could return -ERESTARTSYS. >> >> Now that you're not doing this, but using get_random_u32() instead, >> there's no point to change the function signature of >> key_alloc_serial() and add an error check in key_alloc() that will >> never fail, right? That's just adding a dead code path. Which the >> compiler can probably optimize away, but why make the code slightly >> harder to read than necessasry? > > Good catch, and thanks for reading these so thoroughly that you caught > the churn artifacts. Do you want me to clean this up and resubmit, or > are you planning on adjusting it in the dev branch? Fixed it up here if you just want to grab this instead: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zx2c4/linux.git/patch/?id=a0361e55bce30ace529ed8b28bd452e3ac0ee91f
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