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Message-ID: <20170607235835.jyblbocmkdpe7i2p@thunk.org> Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 19:58:35 -0400 From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:52PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has > initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically > secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the > *_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue: > what happens to our batched entropy that was generated before > initialization. Prior to this commit, it'd stick around, supplying bad > numbers. After this commit, we force the entropy to be re-extracted > after each phase of the crng has initialized. > > In order to avoid a race condition with the position counter, we > introduce a simple rwlock for this invalidation. Since it's only during > this awkward transition period, after things are all set up, we stop > using it, so that it doesn't have an impact on performance. > > This should probably be backported to 4.11. > > (Also: adding my copyright to the top. With the patch series from > January, this patch, and then the ones that come after, I think there's > a relevant amount of code in here to add my name to the top.) > > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> Thanks, applied. This will be on the for_stable that I will be sending to Linus sometime during 4.12-rcX. - Ted
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