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Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 10:26:43 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <>
Cc: David Howells <>, Theodore Ts'o <>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <>,
	LKML <>,,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <>,
	David Miller <>,
	Herbert Xu <>,
	Stephan Mueller <>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that
 the RNG is ready before using

Hi Jason,

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 05:23:04PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hey again Eric,
> One thing led to another and I wound up just rewriting all the crypto
> in big_keys.c. I'll include this for v4:
> Not only was the use of crypto/rng inappropriate, but the decision to
> go with aes-ecb is shocking. Seeing that this author had no other
> commits in the tree, and that all subsequent commits that mentioned
> his name were cleaning up his mess, I just went ahead and removed both
> the crypto/rng misusage and changed from aes-ecb to aes-gcm.
> Anyway, I'll wait for some more reviews on v3, and then this can be
> reviewed for v4.
> Regards,
> Jason

I agree that the use of ECB mode in big_key is broken, and thanks for trying to
fix it!  I think using GCM is good, but please leave a very conspicuous comment
where the nonce is being set to 0, noting that it's safe only because a unique
key is used to encrypt every big_key *and* the big_keys are not updatable (via
an .update method in the key_type), resulting in each GCM key being used for
only a single encryption.

Also, I think you should send this to the keyrings mailing list and maintainer
so it can be discussed and merged separately from your RNG changes.


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