|
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKQ63WOrPMMCVfvRueV2D=YnXAgUGm7zWU+hBSkVDmVwQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2017 12:13:11 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "# 3.4.x" <stable@...r.kernel.org>, Philip Müller <philm@...jaro.org>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms" On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote: > 3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. > > ------------------ > > From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> > > This reverts commit 609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a which is > commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream. > > It shouldn't have been backported to 3.18, as we do not have > get_random_long() in that kernel tree. It should be possible to trivially backport ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 to gain get_random_long(). -Kees > > Reported-by: Philip Müller <philm@...jaro.org> > Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> > Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com> > Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> > Cc: Arjan van Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> > Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> > > --- > kernel/fork.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > --- a/kernel/fork.c > +++ b/kernel/fork.c > @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru > set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); > > #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR > - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); > + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); > #endif > > /* > > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.