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Message-ID: <eaaa2b9f-a032-2f2b-fda0-049adb2679ee@digikod.net>
Date: Sun, 4 Jun 2017 18:43:00 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>, james.l.morris@...cle.com, serge@...lyn.com
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Corey Henderson <corman@...mander.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a
stackable LSM
Hi,
If you want to get some information about the history of TPE in
grsecurity, take a look at
https://github.com/linux-scraping/linux-grsecurity/ and run git log
grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
Here are some links about TPE (before grsecurity used it):
* http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article
* http://phrack.org/issues/53/8.html#article
* https://lwn.net/Articles/32087/
*
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/usenix04/tech/freenix/full_papers/rahimi/rahimi_html/
You may want to adjust the credits.
A more flexible way to configure TPE options (sysctl) may be considered too.
Regards,
Mickaël
On 03/06/2017 07:53, Matt Brown wrote:
> This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
> feature in Grsecurity and also incorporates logging ideas from
> cormander's tpe-lkm.
>
> Modifications from the Grsecurity implementation of TPE were made to
> turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds.
> Also, denial messages were improved by including the full path of the
> disallowed program. (This idea was taken from cormander's tpe-lkm)
>
> Trusted Path Execution is not a new idea:
>
> http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article
>
> | A trusted path is one that is inside is a root owned directory that
> | is not group or world writable. /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, are
> | (under normal circumstances) considered trusted. Any non-root
> | users home directory is not trusted, nor is /tmp.
>
> This Trusted Path Execution implementation introduces the following
> Kconfig options and sysctls. These config behaviors are taken straight
> from Grsecurity's implementation.
>
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE (sysctl=kernel.tpe.enabled)
>
> This option enables Trusted Path Execution. TPE blocks *untrusted*
> users from executing files that meet the following conditions:
>
> * file is not in a root-owned directory
> * file is writable by a user other than root
>
> NOTE: root is never restricted by TPE
>
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid)
>
> This option defines a group id that, by default, is the untrusted group.
> If a user is untrusted then it has the checks described in
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE applied. Otherwise, the user is trusted and the
> checks are not applied. Since root is never restricted by TPE, you can
> effectively remove the concept of a trusted or untrusted group by
> setting this value to 0.
>
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_ALL (sysctl=kernel.tpe.restrict_all)
>
> This option applies another set of restrictions to all non-root users
> even if they are trusted. This only allows execution under the
> following conditions:
>
> * file is in a directory owned by the user that is not group or
> world-writable
> * file is in a directory owned by root and writable only by root
>
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid_invert)
>
> This option reverses the trust logic of the gid option and makes
> kernel.tpe.gid into the trusted group. This means that all other groups
> become untrusted. This sysctl is helpful when you want TPE restrictions
> to apply to most of the users on the system.
>
> Threat Models:
>
> 1. Attacker on system executing exploit on system vulnerability
>
> * If attacker uses a binary as a part of their system exploit, TPE can
> frustrate their efforts
>
> * Issues:
> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run
> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code'
>
> 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a
> malicious one
>
> * This situation arises when administrator of a system leaves a binary
> as world writable.
>
> * TPE is very effective against this threat model
>
> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
> ---
> MAINTAINERS | 5 ++
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++
> security/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/Makefile | 2 +
> security/security.c | 1 +
> security/tpe/Kconfig | 57 +++++++++++++++
> security/tpe/Makefile | 3 +
> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 249 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 security/tpe/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 security/tpe/Makefile
> create mode 100644 security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c
>
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 38d3e4e..1952bd6 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -11357,6 +11357,11 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
> S: Supported
> F: security/yama/
>
> +TPE SECURITY MODULE
> +M: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
> +S: Supported
> +F: security/tpe/
> +
> SENSABLE PHANTOM
> M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...il.com>
> S: Maintained
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index e29d4c6..d017f49 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1920,5 +1920,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
> #else
> static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE
> +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void);
> +#else
> +static inline void tpe_add_hooks(void) { };
> +#endif
>
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 34fb609..30e60cd 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
> source security/apparmor/Kconfig
> source security/loadpin/Kconfig
> source security/yama/Kconfig
> +source security/tpe/Kconfig
>
> source security/integrity/Kconfig
>
> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> index f2d71cd..f8b5197 100644
> --- a/security/Makefile
> +++ b/security/Makefile
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
> +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) += tpe
>
> # always enable default capabilities
> obj-y += commoncap.o
> @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) += tpe/
> obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
>
> # Object integrity file lists
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d0e07f2..ab0dc26 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> capability_add_hooks();
> yama_add_hooks();
> loadpin_add_hooks();
> + tpe_add_hooks();
>
> /*
> * Load all the remaining security modules.
> diff --git a/security/tpe/Kconfig b/security/tpe/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..84fe1b7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/tpe/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
> +config SECURITY_TPE
> + bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)"
> + default n
> + help
> + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
> + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
> + These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
> + root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
> + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
> +
> +config SECURITY_TPE_ALL
> + bool "Partially restrict all non-root users"
> + depends on SECURITY_TPE
> + help
> + If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under
> + a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to,
> + the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a
> + "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID.
> + Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to
> + execute files in directories they own that are not group or
> + world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
> + root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
> + "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
> +
> +config SECURITY_TPE_INVERT
> + bool "Invert GID option"
> + depends on SECURITY_TPE
> + help
> + If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
> + decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
> + option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
> + users on the system. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
> + with name "tpe_invert" is created. Unlike other sysctl options, this
> + entry will default to on for backward-compatibility.
> +
> +config SECURITY_TPE_GID
> + int
> + default SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT)
> + default SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT)
> +
> +config SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID
> + int "GID for TPE-untrusted users"
> + depends on SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT
> + default 1005
> + help
> + Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
> + *enabled* for. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
> + with name "tpe_gid" is created.
> +
> +config SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID
> + int "GID for TPE-trusted users"
> + depends on SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT
> + default 1005
> + help
> + Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
> + *disabled* for. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
> + with name "tpe_gid" is created.
> diff --git a/security/tpe/Makefile b/security/tpe/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..e1bd8ef
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/tpe/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) := tpe_lsm.o
> +
> +tpe-y := tpe_lsm.o
> diff --git a/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..075ca02
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
> +/*
> + * Trusted Path Execution Security Module
> + *
> + * Copyright 2017 Matt Brown
> + *
> + * Author: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
> + *
> + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
> + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
> + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + */
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/uidgid.h>
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
> +#include <linux/limits.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
> +#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
> +
> +#define TPE_GLOBAL_UID(x) from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, (x))
> +#define TPE_GLOBAL_GID(x) from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, (x))
> +#define global_root(x) uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)
> +#define global_nonroot(x) (!uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
> +#define global_nonroot_gid(x) (!gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
> +
> +static int tpe_enabled __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE);
> +static kgid_t tpe_gid __read_mostly = KGIDT_INIT(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID);
> +static int tpe_all __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_ALL);
> +static int tpe_invert __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT);
> +
> +int print_tpe_error(struct file *file, char *reason1, char *reason2)
> +{
> + char *filepath;
> +
> + filepath = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + if (!filepath)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("TPE: Denied execution of %s Reason: %s%s%s\n",
> + (IS_ERR(filepath) ? "failed fetching file path" : filepath),
> + reason1, reason2 ? " and " : "", reason2 ?: "");
> + kfree(filepath);
> + return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
> + * Otherwise return the proper error message
> + *
> + */
> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + struct file *file = bprm->file;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> + char *reason1 = NULL;
> + char *reason2 = NULL;
> +
> + if (!tpe_enabled)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* never restrict root */
> + if (global_root(cred->uid))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!tpe_all)
> + goto general_tpe_check;
> +
> + /* TPE_ALL: restrictions enforced even if the gid is trusted */
> + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid))
> + reason1 = "directory not owned by user";
> + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002)
> + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory";
> + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid))
> + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory";
> + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002)
> + reason1 = "file is world-writable";
> +
> + if (reason1)
> + goto end;
> +
> +general_tpe_check:
> + /* determine if group is trusted */
> + if (tpe_invert && !in_group_p(tpe_gid))
> + reason2 = "not in trusted group";
> + else if (!tpe_invert && in_group_p(tpe_gid))
> + reason2 = "in untrusted group";
> + else
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* main TPE checks */
> + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid))
> + reason1 = "file in non-root-owned directory";
> + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002)
> + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory";
> + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid))
> + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory";
> + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002)
> + reason1 = "file is world-writable";
> +
> +end:
> + if (reason1)
> + return print_tpe_error(file, reason1, reason2);
> + else
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_hook_list tpe_hooks[] = {
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tpe_bprm_set_creds),
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> +struct ctl_path tpe_sysctl_path[] = {
> + { .procname = "kernel", },
> + { .procname = "tpe", },
> + { }
> +};
> +
> +static struct ctl_table tpe_sysctl_table[] = {
> + {
> + .procname = "enabled",
> + .data = &tpe_enabled,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0600,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + {
> + .procname = "gid",
> + .data = &tpe_gid,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0600,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + {
> + .procname = "gid_invert",
> + .data = &tpe_invert,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0600,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + {
> + .procname = "restrict_all",
> + .data = &tpe_all,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0600,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + { }
> +};
> +static void __init tpe_init_sysctl(void)
> +{
> + if (!register_sysctl_paths(tpe_sysctl_path, tpe_sysctl_table))
> + panic("TPE: sysctl registration failed.\n");
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void tpe_init_sysctl(void) { }
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
> +
> +
> +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void)
> +{
> + pr_info("TPE: securing systems like it's 1998\n");
> + security_add_hooks(tpe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tpe_hooks), "tpe");
> + tpe_init_sysctl();
> +}
>
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