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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLGU_HzjKGOCqc5qnCW9Zta6YNcoz2QeNBpvViyUS0GVg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 22:07:12 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Moni Shoua <monis@...lanox.com>, Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>, Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@...el.com>, Hal Rosenstock <hal.rosenstock@...il.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] add the option of fortified string.h functions On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:32 PM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> wrote: > On Fri, 2017-06-02 at 14:07 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: >> On Fri, 26 May 2017 05:54:04 -0400 Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com >> > wrote: >> >> > This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc >> > _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer >> > overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines >> > the >> > size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike >> > glibc, >> > it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. >> >> Did we find a bug in drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c? >> >> i386 allmodconfig: >> >> In file included from ./include/linux/bitmap.h:8:0, >> from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:11, >> from ./include/linux/mm_types_task.h:13, >> from ./include/linux/mm_types.h:4, >> from ./include/linux/kmemcheck.h:4, >> from ./include/linux/skbuff.h:18, >> from drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:34: >> In function 'memcpy', >> inlined from 'send_atomic_ack.constprop' at >> drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:998:2, >> inlined from 'acknowledge' at >> drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1026:3, >> inlined from 'rxe_responder' at >> drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1286:10: >> ./include/linux/string.h:309:4: error: call to '__read_overflow2' >> declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object >> passed as 2nd parameter >> __read_overflow2(); >> >> >> If so, can you please interpret this for the infiniband developers? > > It copies sizeof(skb->cb) bytes with memcpy which is 48 bytes since cb > is a 48 byte char array in `struct sk_buff`. The source buffer is a > `struct rxe_pkt_info`: > > struct rxe_pkt_info { > struct rxe_dev *rxe; /* device that owns packet */ > struct rxe_qp *qp; /* qp that owns packet */ > struct rxe_send_wqe *wqe; /* send wqe */ > u8 *hdr; /* points to bth */ > u32 mask; /* useful info about pkt */ > u32 psn; /* bth psn of packet */ > u16 pkey_index; /* partition of pkt */ > u16 paylen; /* length of bth - icrc */ > u8 port_num; /* port pkt received on */ > u8 opcode; /* bth opcode of packet */ > u8 offset; /* bth offset from pkt->hdr */ > }; > > That looks like 32 bytes (1 byte of padding) on 32-bit and 48 bytes on > 64-bit (1 byte of padding), so on 32-bit there's a read overflow of 16 > bytes from the stack here. This should work (untested): diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c index 23039768f541..7b226deb83bb 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c @@ -995,7 +995,9 @@ static int send_atomic_ack(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_pkt_info *pkt, free_rd_atomic_resource(qp, res); rxe_advance_resp_resource(qp); - memcpy(SKB_TO_PKT(skb), &ack_pkt, sizeof(skb->cb)); + memcpy(SKB_TO_PKT(skb), &ack_pkt, sizeof(ack_ptr)); + memset(SKB_TO_PKT(skb) + sizeof(ack_ptr), 0, + sizeof(skb->cb) - sizeof(ack_ptr)); res->type = RXE_ATOMIC_MASK; res->atomic.skb = skb; Andrew, there are other fortify fixes too: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/fortify&id=af6b0151896240457ef0fdc18ace533c3d3fbb75 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/fortify&id=186eaf81b43bf90d6b533732fb11ad31ca27df9d https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/fortify&id=95d589f21b3aef757f0eb3d0224b78648a4b22d2 https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/commit/576e64469b0c4634c007445c5f16bfde610b3600 Do you want me to resend these for you to carry, or reping maintainers? Other fixes have already landed in -next. (And there are two arm64 fixes, too.) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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