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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1706020830520.16910@namei.org> Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 08:56:13 +1000 (AEST) From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> cc: lazytyped <lazytyped@...il.com>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Kees Cook wrote: > All of the reasoning here seems to match the link restrictions from 5 > years ago: a crappy API (sticky bit) is not handled by userspace (open > /tmp/$$!) and people get attacked. The solution was a sysctl to enable > the link restrictions that killed the entire class of the common > attack (though it didn't solve especially egregious bad uses, much This is the problem -- it doesn't really eliminate the underlying issue. A better solution (in this case) was to implement a new API which addresses the issue at an architectural level, i.e. namespace-based private /tmp views, and encourage its adoption. > like the TIOCSTI fix). Every distro enabled the sysctl, and, while the > data is noisy, looking a CVEs matching "/tmp symlink", the numbers > drop from 2013 and later (with none yet for 2017). I wonder how much of this is due to the sysctl vs. adoption of private /tmp, and what may be lurking in the "egregious bad uses" category for future CVEs. And obviously we don't know what various folk may have up their sleeves, if anything. -- James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
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