kernel-hardening mailing list - 2017/06

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2017/06

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
			¹ 12	² 33	³ 37	⁴ 27
⁵ 31	⁶ 78	⁷ 45	⁸ 44	⁹ 17	¹⁰ 13	¹¹ 9
¹² 30	¹³ 20	¹⁴ 13	¹⁵ 31	¹⁶ 7	¹⁷ 6	¹⁸ 5
¹⁹ 37	²⁰ 50	²¹ 20	²² 10	²³ 21	²⁴ 5	²⁵ 1
²⁶ 11	²⁷ 22	²⁸ 6	²⁹ 26	³⁰ 18

Messages by day:

June 1 (12 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (lazytyped <lazytyped@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] refcount: Create unchecked atomic_t implementation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 next 1/3] modules:capabilities: allow __request_module() to take a capability argument (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 next 1/3] modules:capabilities: allow __request_module() to take a capability argument (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)

June 2 (33 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 2/6] x86/elf: move 32 bit ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 256MB (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 0/6] move mmap_area and PIE binaries away from the stack (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 3/6] x86/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 6/6] powerpc,mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 1/6] binfmt_elf: document load_bias a little bit (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 5/6] arm64: move COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE lower in the address space (riel@...hat.com)
[PATCH 4/6] arm64/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base (riel@...hat.com)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/6] binfmt_elf: document load_bias a little bit (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4] add the option of fortified string.h functions (Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4] add the option of fortified string.h functions (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)

June 3 (37 messages)

Re: Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
[PATCH RFC 0/3] get_random_bytes seed blocking ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC 2/3] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC 3/3] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC 1/3] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86/elf: move 32 bit ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 256MB (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] move mmap_area and PIE binaries away from the stack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4] add the option of fortified string.h functions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86/elf: move 32 bit ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 256MB (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] move mmap_area and PIE binaries away from the stack (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Lionel Debroux <lionel_debroux@...oo.fr>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Corey Henderson <corman@...mander.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)

June 4 (27 messages)

[PATCH net-next v10 0/5] Avoiding stack overflow in skb_to_sgvec ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH net-next v10 1/5] skbuff: return -EMSGSIZE in skb_to_sgvec to prevent overflow ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH net-next v10 2/5] ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH net-next v10 5/5] virtio_net: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH net-next v10 3/5] rxrpc: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH net-next v10 4/5] macsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/1] Sealable memory support (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Peter Dolding <oiaohm@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Hector Martin <marcan@...can.st>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Hector Martin <marcan@...can.st>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)

June 5 (31 messages)

Re: Stop the plagiarism (Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH net-next v10 0/5] Avoiding stack overflow in skb_to_sgvec (David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>)
[PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 1/8] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 2/8] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 3/8] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 4/8] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 5/8] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 6/8] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 8/8] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 7/8] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications (Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86/elf: move 32 bit ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 256MB (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
[PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 6… (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundat…)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Pavel Labushev <pavel.labushev@...box.no>)
Re: [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64… (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/5] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/5] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits… (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/5] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 5/8] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)

June 6 (78 messages)

Re: Stop the plagiarism (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64… (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundat…)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/5] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use (David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Stop the plagiarism (Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[RFC v5 PATCH 0/4] NOT FOR MERGE - ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/4] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 4/4] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/4] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)

June 7 (45 messages)

Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto (Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>)
Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto (David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
[PATCH v3] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications (Bhupesh SHARMA <bhupesh.linux@...il.com>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v6 0/4] ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/4] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/4] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 4/4] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[RFC v4 0/3] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
[RFC v4 2/3] lkdtm: Add tests for XPFO (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
[RFC v4 3/3] xpfo: add support for hugepages (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
[RFC v4 1/3] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
[PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)

June 8 (44 messages)

Re: [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
[PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
[PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use (Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (Kevin Easton <kevin@...rana.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use (Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
[PATCH 0/6] LSM: Security module blob management (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 1/6] procfs-add-smack-subdir-to-attrs (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 2/6] LSM-manage-credential-security-blobs (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 3/6] LSM: Manage file security blobs (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 5/6] LSM: Infrastructure management of the remaining blobs (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 6/6] LSM: general but not extreme module stacking (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
[PATCH 4/6] LSM: manage task security blobs (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] LSM: Security module blob management (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
hard link restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)

June 9 (17 messages)

[PATCH] random: default the warning to be on ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] LSM: Security module blob management (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
Re: Patch for random mac address (HacKurx <hackurx@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Patch for random mac address (Anisse Astier <anisse@...ier.eu>)
Re: Patch for random mac address (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
[PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)

June 10 (13 messages)

Re: [RFC v4 3/3] xpfo: add support for hugepages (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 1/6] sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 2/6] net/ipv6: use constant time memory comparison for mac ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 3/6] ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH 6/6] mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Patch for random mac address (HacKurx <hackurx@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/6] ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/6] ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags (Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@...yossef.com>)
Re: [PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values (Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/6] ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags (Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>)

June 11 (9 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
[PATCH] rsa-pkcs1pad: use constant time memory comparison for MACs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Emmanuel Grumbach <egrumbach@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Emil Lenngren <emil.lenngren@...il.com>)

June 12 (30 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Emmanuel Grumbach <egrumbach@...il.com>)
RE: hard link restrictions ("Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@...adcom.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important (Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
Re: [RFC v4 3/3] xpfo: add support for hugepages (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
[PATCH 4.4 47/90] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit pla… (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundat…)
Re: [PATCH 4.4 47/90] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
[PATCH 3.18 26/45] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit pl… (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundat…)
Re: [PATCH 4.4 47/90] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
[PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A. (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@...sung.com>)
Re: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)

June 13 (20 messages)

Re: [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/6] mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs (Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>)
Re: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/6] mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)

June 14 (13 messages)

Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@...akpoint.cc>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)

June 15 (31 messages)

[PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>)
[PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>)
[PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux Kerne… (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the… (Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to … (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com…)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linu… (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to … (W Stacy Lockwood <vladinator@...il.com>)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Li… (Wade Smart <wadesmart@...il.com>)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux… (J <dreadpiratejeff@...il.com>)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux … (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
[RFC v2 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 1/9] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 2/9] S.A.R.A. framework creation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 4/9] S.A.R.A. cred blob management (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 7/9] Trampoline emulation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 8/9] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A. (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[RFC v2 9/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 7/9] Trampoline emulation (aconcernedfossdev@...mail.cc)
Re: Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the L… (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)

June 16 (7 messages)

[RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@...akpoint.cc>)
Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@...akpoint.cc>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Lee Duncan <lduncan@...e.com>)

June 17 (6 messages)

Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Lee Duncan <lduncan@...e.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Paul Koning <paulkoning@...cast.net>)
[PATCH v2 22/31] gcc-plugins.txt: standardize document format (Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...pensource.com>)

June 18 (5 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)

June 19 (37 messages)

[PATCH v5] add the option of fortified string.h functions (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v2 22/31] gcc-plugins.txt: standardize document format (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH v3 0/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/4] task_struct: Allow randomized layout (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 4/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 2/4] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5] add the option of fortified string.h functions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 04/23] vfs: copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 01/23] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 03/23] vfs: define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 06/23] cifs: define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 08/23] ext2: define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 09/23] ext4: define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 10/23] vxfs: define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 11/23] jfs: define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 15/23] net: define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 07/23] exofs: define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 14/23] fork: define usercopy region in thread_stack, task_struct, mm_struct slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 13/23] ufs: define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 12/23] orangefs: define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 02/23] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 20/23] usercopy: convert kmalloc caches to usercopy caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 19/23] xfs: define usercopy region in xfs_inode slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 18/23] scsi: define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 20 (50 messages)

[PATCH] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] rsa-pkcs1pad: use constant time memory comparison for MACs (Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering (Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Joel Stanley <joel@....id.au>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
Re: [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls ("Hector Martin \"marcan\"" <marcan@...can.st>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls ("Hector Martin \"marcan\"" <marcan@...can.st>)
Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs ("Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>)
Re: hard link restrictions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs ("Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)

June 21 (20 messages)

[PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race (Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>)

June 22 (10 messages)

Re: [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
[PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
[PATCH] binfmt_elf: Safely increment argv pointers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 2/4] arm64: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/4] powerpc: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 0/4] Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/4] arm: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 4/4] s390: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 23 (21 messages)

Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs ("Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [kernel hardening]Could we do something for KSPP? (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [kernel hardening]Could we do something for KSPP? (Li Kun <hw.likun@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] arm64: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] arm64: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] arm64: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/4] arm64: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 0/5] Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 3/5] arm64: Move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 5/5] s390: Move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 4/5] powerpc: Move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 2/5] arm: Move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 1/5] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 24 (5 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 25 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 26 (11 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@...ux-iscsi.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
[PATCH v7 0/3] ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/3] Protectable memory support (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/3] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use (Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc: Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
non-x86 per-task stack canaries (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)
Re: non-x86 per-task stack canaries (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
[PATCH] random: Do not ignore early device randomness (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 27 (22 messages)

Re: [PATCH 1/3] Protectable memory support (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/3] Protectable memory support (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: non-x86 per-task stack canaries (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 0/3] mm: LSM: ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/3] Protectable memory support (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/3] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option ("igor.stoppa@...il.com" <igor.stoppa@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC v2 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC v2 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC v2 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC v2 7/9] Trampoline emulation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 28 (6 messages)

Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 29 (26 messages)

7361ce7529: BUG:sleeping_function_called_from_invalid_context_at_mm/slab.h (kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection (Li Kun <hw.likun@...wei.com>)
[RFC PATCH 2/4] PM / hibernate: Use linux/set_memory.h (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
[RFC PATCH 4/4] bpf: Use linux/set_memory.h (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
[RFC PATCH 3/4] module: Use linux/set_memory.h (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
[RFC PATCH 1/4] Provide linux/set_memory.h (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
My mail to the grsecurity team to expose their FUD (Raj Brar <rarbrar.32@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] bpf: Use linux/set_memory.h (Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>)
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] Provide linux/set_memory.h (Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>)
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] Provide linux/set_memory.h (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] Provide linux/set_memory.h (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 7/9] Trampoline emulation (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC v2 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Leave of Absence (David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

June 30 (18 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] Provide linux/set_memory.h (Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection (Li Kun <hw.likun@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use ("Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@...ux-iscsi.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
[PATCH] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: [PATCH] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: [PATCH] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
[PATCH v2] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
Re: [PATCH] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] ARM: fix randomized task_struct (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

685 messages

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