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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKQGiAcLe-6yWuqgZMQSFkO=zUR40G0=Th=qWxV+4Y+wA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 09:16:01 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com> To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, linux-sh <linux-sh@...r.kernel.org>, Yoshinori Sato <ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 8:57 AM, <riel@...hat.com> wrote: > From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> > > Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows > from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they > somehow obtain the canary value. > > Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. > > Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> -Kees > --- > kernel/fork.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c > index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644 > --- a/kernel/fork.c > +++ b/kernel/fork.c > @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) > set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); > > #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR > - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); > + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary(); > #endif > > /* > -- > 2.9.3 > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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