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Message-Id: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 11:57:46 -0400
From: riel@...hat.com
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: danielmicay@...il.com, tytso@....edu, keescook@...omium.org, hpa@...or.com,
luto@...capital.net, mingo@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
linux-sh@...r.kernel.org, ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems,
in order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the
canary, and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or
obtained through some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems,
which will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32
bit systems, so the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on
64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
v2:
- improve changelogs
- address Ingo's coding style comments
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