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Message-Id: <20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 11:57:48 -0400
From: riel@...hat.com
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: danielmicay@...il.com, tytso@....edu, keescook@...omium.org, hpa@...or.com,
luto@...capital.net, mingo@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
linux-sh@...r.kernel.org, ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary
From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
---
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
- tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
+ tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary();
#endif
/*
--
2.9.3
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