[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20170420151928.GA14559@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2017 10:19:28 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, jmorris@...ei.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, jslaby@...e.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, jannh@...gle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoting Matt Brown (matt@...tt.com):
> On 04/19/2017 07:53 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >Quoting Matt Brown (matt@...tt.com):
> >>On 04/19/2017 12:58 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>>On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:45:26PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> >>>>This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity
> >>>>project in-kernel.
> >>>>
> >>>>This will create the Kconfig SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT and the corresponding
> >>>>sysctl kernel.tiocsti_restrict that, when activated, restrict all TIOCSTI
> >>>>ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
> >>>>
> >>>>Possible effects on userland:
> >>>>
> >>>>There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
> >>>>change.
> >>>>See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
> >>>>notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
> >>>>
> >>>>However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
> >>>>Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the
> >>>
> >>>It's not worthless, but note that for instance before this was fixed
> >>>in lxc, this patch would not have helped with escapes from privileged
> >>>containers.
> >>>
> >>
> >>I assume you are talking about this CVE:
> >>https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256
> >>
> >>In retrospect, is there any way that an escape from a privileged
> >>container with the this bug could have been prevented?
> >
> >I don't know, that's what I was probing for. Detecting that the pgrp
> >or session - heck, the pid namespace - has changed would seem like a
> >good indicator that it shouldn't be able to push.
> >
>
> pgrp and session won't do because in the case we are discussing
> current->signal->tty is the same as tty.
>
> This is the current check that is already in place:
> | if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> | return -EPERM;
Yeah...
> The only thing I could find to detect the tty message coming from a
> container is as follows:
> | task_active_pid_ns(current)->level
>
> This will be zero when run on the host, but 1 when run inside a
> container. However this is very much a hack and could probably break
> some userland stuff where there are multiple levels of namespaces.
Yes. This is also however why I don't like the current patch, because
capable() will never be true in a container, so nested containers break.
What does current->signal->tty->pgrp actually point to? Can we take
it to be the pgrp which opened it? Could we check
ns_capable(current_pid_ns()->user_ns, CAP_whatever) and get a meaningful
answer?
> The real problem is that there are no TTY namespaces. I don't think we
> can solve this problem for CAP_SYS_ADMIN containers unless we want to
> introduce a config that allows one to override normal CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> functionality by denying TIOCSTI ioctls for processes whom
> task_active_pid_ns(current)->level is equal to 0.
>
> In the mean time, I think we can go ahead with this feature to give
> people the ability to lock down non CAP_SYS_ADMIN containers/processes.
>
> >>>>same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
> >>>>opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
> >>>>features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
> >>>>Kconfig help message.
> >>>>
> >>>>Threat Model/Patch Rational:
> >>>>
> >>>>>From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
> >>>>
> >>>>| There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
> >>>>| has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
> >>>>| the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
> >>>>| attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
> >>>>| processes within the same user's compromised session.
> >>>>
> >>>>So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
> >>>>that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
> >>>>boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
> >>>>or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
> >>>>descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
> >>>>
> >>>>This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
> >>>><http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
> >>>>
> >>>>Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
> >>>>---
> >>>>drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 4 ++++
> >>>>include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++
> >>>>kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> >>>>security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> >>>>4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> >>>>
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> >>>>index e6d1a65..31894e8 100644
> >>>>--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> >>>>@@ -2296,11 +2296,15 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
> >>>> * FIXME: may race normal receive processing
> >>>> */
> >>>>
> >>>>+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
> >>>>+
> >>>>static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
> >>>>{
> >>>> char ch, mbz = 0;
> >>>> struct tty_ldisc *ld;
> >>>>
> >>>>+ if (tiocsti_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >>>>+ return -EPERM;
> >>>> if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >>>> return -EPERM;
> >>>> if (get_user(ch, p))
> >>>>diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
> >>>>index 1017e904..7011102 100644
> >>>>--- a/include/linux/tty.h
> >>>>+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
> >>>>@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
> >>>> struct list_head list;
> >>>>};
> >>>>
> >>>>+extern int tiocsti_restrict;
> >>>>+
> >>>>/* tty magic number */
> >>>>#define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401
> >>>>
> >>>>diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> >>>>index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
> >>>>--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> >>>>+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> >>>>@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
> >>>>#include <linux/kexec.h>
> >>>>#include <linux/bpf.h>
> >>>>#include <linux/mount.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/tty.h>
> >>>>
> >>>>#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >>>>#include <asm/processor.h>
> >>>>@@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> >>>> .extra2 = &two,
> >>>> },
> >>>>#endif
> >>>>+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
> >>>>+ {
> >>>>+ .procname = "tiocsti_restrict",
> >>>>+ .data = &tiocsti_restrict,
> >>>>+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> >>>>+ .mode = 0644,
> >>>>+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
> >>>>+ .extra1 = &zero,
> >>>>+ .extra2 = &one,
> >>>>+ },
> >>>>+#endif
> >>>> {
> >>>> .procname = "ngroups_max",
> >>>> .data = &ngroups_max,
> >>>>diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> >>>>index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
> >>>>--- a/security/Kconfig
> >>>>+++ b/security/Kconfig
> >>>>@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
> >>>>
> >>>> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> >>>>
> >>>>+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
> >>>
> >>>This is an odd way to name this. Shouldn't the name reflect that it
> >>>is setting the default, rather than enabling the feature?
> >>>
> >>>Besides that, I'm ok with the patch.
> >>>
> >>>>+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
> >>>>+ default n
> >>>>+ help
> >>>>+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
> >>>>+ into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
> >>>>+ ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
> >>>>+ unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> >>>>+
> >>>>config SECURITY
> >>>> bool "Enable different security models"
> >>>> depends on SYSFS
> >>>>--
> >>>>2.10.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
