[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <4a7ab5c3-590e-891f-61ce-534483dc2ec6@nmatt.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 20:08:02 -0400
From: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: serge@...lyn.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, jslaby@...e.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, jannh@...gle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
On 04/19/2017 07:18 AM, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 18 Apr 2017, Matt Brown wrote:
>
>> This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity
>> project in-kernel.
>
> It seems like an ugly hack to an ugly feature (CAP_SYS_ADMIN barely makes
> sense here), and rather than sprinkling these types of things throughout
> the kernel, I wonder if it might be better to implement it via LSM, in the
> YAMA module.
>
>
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is already used in the TIOCSTI TTY code to allow
character insertion into TTYs other than the caller's controlling
terminal. This is done because different TTYs indicate a security
boundary that should only be able to be crossed by a privileged
process. This patch would merely extend this security boundary
protection to include unprivileged processes from utilizing a common
TTY to step across a security boundary.
>
> - James
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
