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Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu9YfALdyL-28X20X=T=XyyjDUxmtHy3_ZDDq-PF8RMxUA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2017 10:44:39 +0100
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>, Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@...aro.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Roy Franz <rfranz@...ium.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI
rt services region
On 10 April 2017 at 10:41, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 07, 2017 at 04:51:16PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 7 April 2017 at 16:47, James Morse <james.morse@....com> wrote:
>> > On 24/03/17 13:24, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> >> Update the allocation logic for the virtual mapping of the UEFI runtime
>> >> services to start from a randomized base address if KASLR is in effect,
>> >> and if the UEFI firmware exposes an implementation of EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL.
>> >>
>> >> This makes it more difficult to predict the location of exploitable
>> >> data structures in the runtime UEFI firmware, which increases robustness
>> >> against attacks. Note that these regions are only mapped during the
>> >> time a runtime service call is in progress, and only on a single CPU
>> >> at a time, bit give the lack of a downside, let's enable it nonetheless.
>> >
>> > With next-20170407 on Seattle Overdrive, I get an SError[0] on boot:
>
>> > * Revert "ef/libstub/arm/arm64: Randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region"
>> >
>> > At which point the machine start booting to a prompt again, (its noisier than
>> > usual but looks like double-printing).
>
>> That is quite interesting, to be honest, because that patch should
>> effectively be a NOP on systems that do not implement
>> EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL.
>
> FWIW, I'm also seeing a crash as a result of this patch, on a Juno R1
> with an EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL implementation, with next-20170410 defconfig.
> I'm using the Linaro 15.08 toolchain.
>
> ----
> EFI stub: Booting Linux Kernel...
> EFI stub: Using DTB from configuration table
>
>
> WARNING: this system is using an unsafe pseudo-random implementation of
> RngLib!
>
>
>
> Synchronous Exception at 0x00000000F80FC7E8
> ----
>
> If I replace the !nokaslr() in efi_entry() with false, my kernel boots.
>
> If I replace !nokaslr() with true, it fails to boot, even with the call
> to efi_get_random_bytes() replaced with status = EFI_ERROR.
>
> The problem appears to be the use of TASK_SIZE, since on arm64 that's:
>
> #define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
> TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64)
>
> ... which would mean that the stub would be trying to dereference whatever it
> found in sp_el0. Looking at objdump:
>
> 0000000000000160 <efi_entry>:
> ...
> 4b4: 94000000 bl 0 <nokaslr>
> 4b8: 35000280 cbnz w0, 508 <efi_entry+0x3a8>
> 4bc: d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
> 4c0: f9400004 ldr x4, [x0]
> ...
>
> So I think we should revert this for now.
>
Thanks for debugging this! I will get a fixed version out asap
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