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Message-Id: <1491734530-25002-3-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 12:42:09 +0200
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
To: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Dongsu Park <dpark@...teo.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
<serge@...lyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module
This adds the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module. The new module
is a stackable LSM that has been tested with Yama and SELinux, all
the three modules running.
The module applies restrictions on automatic module loading operations.
If it is selected, every request to use a kernel feature that is implemented
by modules that are not loaded will first have to satisfy the access rules
of ModAutoRestrict LSM. If the access is authorized then the module will
be automatically loaded. Furthermore, this allows system administrators
or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded modules or abuse the
interface.
The settings can be applied globally using a sysctl interface which
completes the core kernel interface "modules_disable" that works only
on two modes: allow or deny, ignoring that module loading can be either
an explicit operation or an implicit one via automatic loading. The
CAP_SYS_MODULE capability can be used to restrict explicit operations,
however implicit module loading is in general not subject to permission
checks which allows unprivileged to insert modules.
Using the new ModAutoRestrict settings allow to control if implicit
operations are allowed or denied.
This behaviour was inspired from grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN option.
The feature is also available as a prctl() interface. This allows to
apply restrictions when sandboxing processes. On embedded Linux systems,
or containers where only some containers/processes should have the
right privileges to load modules, this allows to restrict those
processes from inserting modules through the autoload feature, only
privileged processes can be allowed to perform so. A more restrictive
access can be applied where the module autoload feature is completely
disabled.
In this schema the access rules are per-process and inherited by
children created by fork(2) and clone(2), and preserved across execve(2).
Current interface:
*) The per-process prctl() settings are:
prctl(PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS, PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, value, 0, 0)
Where value means:
0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes.
1 - The current process must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to
auto-load modules. CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load
modules with a 'netdev-%s' alias.
2 - Current process can not auto-load modules. Once set, this prctl
value can not be changed.
The per-process value may only be increased, never decreased, thus ensuring
that once applied, processes can never relaxe their setting.
*) The global sysctl setting can be set by writting an integer value to
'/proc/sys/kernel/modautorestrict/autoload'
The valid values are:
0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes.
1 - Processes must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to auto-load modules.
CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load modules with a 'netdev-%s'
alias.
2 - Processes can not auto-load modules. Once set, this sysctl value
can not be changed.
*) Access rules:
First the prctl() settings are checked, if the access is not denied
then the global sysctl settings are checked.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 7 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 +
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/Makefile | 16 +-
security/modautorestrict/Kconfig | 15 ++
security/modautorestrict/Makefile | 3 +
security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 1 +
9 files changed, 418 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index c45c02b..38d17cd 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -11326,6 +11326,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
S: Supported
F: security/yama/
+MODAUTORESTRICT SECURITY MODULE
+M: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
+L: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
+L: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
+S: Supported
+F: security/modautorestrict/
+
SENSABLE PHANTOM
M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...il.com>
S: Maintained
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index ca19cdb..679800c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1950,6 +1950,11 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
#else
static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT
+extern void modautorestrict_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init modautorestrict_init(void) { }
+#endif
/*
* Per "struct task_struct" security blob is managed using index numbers.
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a8d0759..e561ca3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -197,4 +197,9 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
+/* Control ModAutoRestrict LSM options */
+#define PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS 48
+# define PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 1
+# define PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 2
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..1e181c3 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
source security/loadpin/Kconfig
source security/yama/Kconfig
+source security/modautorestrict/Kconfig
source security/integrity/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f2d71cd..4c120f7 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@
# Makefile for the kernel security code
#
-obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
-subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9678106
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+config SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT
+ bool "Automatic Module Loading Restriction"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ default n
+ help
+ This selects ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module which applies
+ restrictions on automatic module loading operations. If this
+ option is selected, a request to use a kernel feature that is
+ implemented by an unloaded module will first have to satisfy the
+ access rules of MODAUTORESTRICT. Furthermore, this allows system
+ administrators or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded
+ modules.
+ Further information can be found in Documentation/security/ModAutoRestrict.txt.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Makefile b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0656a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) := modautorestrict.o
+
+modautorestrict-y := modauto_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a83b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Djalal Harouni
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Djalal Harouni
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Endocode AG.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+enum {
+ MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED = 0,
+ MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED = 1,
+ MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED = 2,
+};
+
+struct modautoload_task {
+ bool usage;
+ u8 flags;
+};
+
+static int autoload_restrict;
+
+static int zero;
+static int max_autoload_restrict = MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED;
+
+/* Index number of per "struct task_struct" blob for ModAutoRestrict. */
+u16 modautorestrict_task_security_index __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline int modautoload_task_set_flag(struct modautoload_task *modtask,
+ unsigned long value)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ else if (modtask->flags > value)
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ else if (modtask->flags < value)
+ modtask->flags = value;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline struct modautoload_task *modautoload_task_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+
+ modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index);
+ if (modtask->usage)
+ return modtask;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct modautoload_task *init_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+
+ modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index);
+
+ modtask->flags = (u8)flags;
+ modtask->usage = true;
+
+ return modtask;
+}
+
+static inline void clear_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+
+ modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk);
+ if (modtask) {
+ modtask->usage = false;
+ modtask->flags = MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 if CAP_SYS_MODULE or if CAP_NET_ADMIN and the module is
+ * a netdev-%s module. Otherwise -EPERM is returned.
+ */
+static int modautoload_privileged_access(const char *name)
+{
+ int ret = -EPERM;
+
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (name && strstr(name, "netdev-") && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ ret = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int modautoload_sysctl_perm(unsigned long op, const char *name)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
+
+ if (op != PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (autoload_restrict) {
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED:
+ /*
+ * Are we allowed to sleep here ?
+ * Also improve this check here
+ */
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ mm = get_task_mm(current);
+ if (mm) {
+ ret = modautoload_privileged_access(name);
+ mmput(mm);
+ }
+ break;
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED:
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int modautoload_task_perm(struct modautoload_task *mtask,
+ char *kmod_name)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (mtask->flags) {
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED:
+ ret = modautoload_privileged_access(kmod_name);
+ break;
+ case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED:
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Set the given option in a modautorestrict task */
+static int modautoload_set_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ unsigned long value)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+
+ if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED)
+ return ret;
+
+ modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk);
+ if (!modtask) {
+ modtask = init_modautoload_task(tsk, value);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return modautoload_task_set_flag(modtask, value);
+}
+
+static int modautoload_get_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+
+ modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk);
+ if (!modtask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return modtask->flags;
+}
+
+/* Copy modautorestrict context from parent to child */
+int modautoload_task_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ struct modautoload_task *modparent;
+
+ modparent = modautoload_task_security(current);
+
+ /* Parent has a modautorestrict context */
+ if (modparent)
+ init_modautoload_task(tsk, modparent->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 on success, -error on error. -ENOSYS is returned when modautorestrict
+ * does not handle the given option, or -EINVAL if the passed arguments are not
+ * valid.
+ */
+int modautoload_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct task_struct *myself = current;
+
+ if (option != PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ get_task_struct(myself);
+
+ switch (arg2) {
+ case PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT:
+ if (arg4 || arg5)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = modautoload_set_op_value(myself, arg3);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT:
+ if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = modautoload_get_op_value(myself);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ put_task_struct(myself);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void modautoload_task_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ clear_modautoload_task(tsk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO:
+ * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it.
+ */
+static int modautoload_kernel_module_file(struct file *file)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+ struct task_struct *myself = current;
+
+ /* First check if the task allows that */
+ modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself);
+ if (modtask) {
+ ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, NULL);
+}
+
+static int modautoload_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct modautoload_task *modtask;
+ struct task_struct *myself = current;
+
+ /* First check if the task allows that */
+ modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself);
+ if (modtask) {
+ ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, kmod_name);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, kmod_name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO:
+ * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it.
+ */
+static int modautoload_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case READING_MODULE:
+ ret = modautoload_kernel_module_file(file);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list modautoload_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, modautoload_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, modautoload_kernel_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, modautoload_task_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, modautoload_task_prctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, modautoload_task_free),
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int modautoload_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table table_copy;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ table_copy = *table;
+ if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2)
+ table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2;
+
+ return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+struct ctl_path modautoload_sysctl_path[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel", },
+ { .procname = "modautorestrict", },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table modautoload_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "autoload",
+ .data = &autoload_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = modautoload_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &max_autoload_restrict,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+static void __init modautoload_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+ if (!register_sysctl_paths(modautoload_sysctl_path, modautoload_sysctl_table))
+ panic("modautorestrict: sysctl registration failed.\n");
+}
+#else
+static inline void modautoload_init_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+void __init modautorestrict_init(void)
+{
+ modautorestrict_task_security_index =
+ security_reserve_task_blob_index(sizeof(struct modautoload_task));
+ security_add_hooks(modautoload_hooks,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(modautoload_hooks), "modautorestrict");
+
+ modautoload_init_sysctl();
+ pr_info("ModAutoRestrict LSM: Initialized\n");
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4dc6bca..d8852fe 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
capability_add_hooks();
yama_add_hooks();
loadpin_add_hooks();
+ modautorestrict_init();
/*
* Load all the remaining security modules.
--
2.10.2
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