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Date: Tue,  4 Apr 2017 15:12:11 -0700
From: Kees Cook <>
To: Ingo Molnar <>
Cc: Kees Cook <>,
	Peter Zijlstra <>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <>,
	Kalle Valo <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	Rik van Riel <>,
	Jakub Kicinski <>,
	Viresh Kumar <>,
	Andy Shevchenko <>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <>,
	Olof Johansson <>,
	Chris Wilson <>,
	George Spelvin <>,
	Thomas Gleixner <>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <>,
	David Windsor <>,,
Subject: [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION

This continues in applying the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION tests where
appropriate, and pulling similar CONFIGs under the same check. Most
notably, this adds the checks to refcount_t so that system builders can
Oops their kernels when encountering a potential refcounter attack. (And
so now the LKDTM tests for refcount issues pass correctly.)

The series depends on the changes in -next made to lib/refcount.c,
so it might be easiest if this goes through the locking tree...

v2 is a rebase to -next and adjusts to using WARN_ONCE() instead of WARN().


v1 was here:

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