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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZHJ1WFcE7QY6qLM9RMUJbGXxTpp3WsCNJBX4h1U-4HEjA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 08:17:11 -0700 From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> To: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, René Nyffenegger <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, James Morse <james.morse@....com>, "linux-s390@...r.kernel.org" <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 1:14 AM, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> wrote: > On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 01:34:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return >> still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks. >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> > > ... > >> +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void) >> +{ >> + /* >> + * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall. >> + * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce >> + * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should >> + * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system. >> + */ >> + mm_segment_t lowfs; >> +#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG >> + lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE); >> +#else >> + lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE; >> +#endif >> + >> + pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n"); >> + set_fs(lowfs); >> +} > > This won't work on architectures where the set_fs() argument does not > contain an address but an address space identifier. This is true e.g. for > s390 and as far as I know also for sparc. > On s390 we have complete distinct address spaces for kernel and user space > that each start at address zero. > The patch that enforce USER_DS is disabled on s390 anyway. I guess, we can just do a set_fs(KERNEL_DS) for the others. -- Thomas
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