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Message-Id: <20170323025549.19588-1-ewk@edkovsky.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 20:55:47 -0600
From: Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>
To: jeyu@...hat.com,
rusty@...tcorp.com.au,
keescook@...omium.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
Provide a mechanism for other functions to verify that their arguments
are read-only.
This implements the first half of a suggestion made by Kees Cook for
the Kernel Self Protection Project:
- provide mechanism to check for ro_after_init memory areas, and
reject structures not marked ro_after_init in vmbus_register()
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/02/04/1
The idea is to prevent structures (including modules) that are not
read-only from being passed to functions. It builds upon the functions
in kernel/extable.c that test if an address is in the text section.
I have dropped the third patch that uses these features to check the
arguments to vmbus_register() because the maintainers have not been
receptive to using it. My goal right now is to get the API right.
I have test compiled this series on next-20170321 for x86.
Eddie Kovsky (2):
module: verify address is read-only
extable: verify address is read-only
include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++
include/linux/module.h | 12 ++++++++++++
kernel/extable.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
--
2.12.0
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