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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJw2XW30NUnoNOMunZMhZ5V-3K9rspOFTOnyt5bxnkA+A@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 13:57:09 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, René Nyffenegger <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Stanislav Kinsburskiy <skinsbursky@...tuozzo.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...e.com>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, James Morse <james.morse@....com>, Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote: > This patch prevents a syscall to modify the address limit of the > caller. The address limit is kept by the syscall wrapper and restored > just after the syscall ends. > > For example, it would mitigation this bug: > > - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 > > By default, this change warns if the segment is incorrect while > returning to user-mode and fix it. The > CONFIG_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG option can be enabled to halt > instead if needed. Instead of this new config, please reuse the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION test instead, which already controls very similar WARN vs BUG behavior. Example below... > > The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also > added so each architecture can optimize how the > verify_pre_usermode_state function is called. > > Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> > --- > Based on next-20170308 > --- > include/linux/syscalls.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ > init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > kernel/sys.c | 11 +++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h > index 980c3c9b06f8..78a2268ecd6e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h > +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h > @@ -191,6 +191,22 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs; > SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \ > __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__) > > +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void); > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE > +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) { > + bool ret = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS); > + // Prevent re-ordering the call > + barrier(); > + return ret; > +} > +#else > +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) { > + return false; > +} > +#endif > + > + > #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__) > #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \ > asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \ > @@ -199,7 +215,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs; > asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)); \ > asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \ > { \ > + bool user_caller = has_user_ds(); \ > long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \ > + if (user_caller) \ > + verify_pre_usermode_state(); \ > __MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__); \ > __PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__)); \ > return ret; \ > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig > index c859c993c26f..ab958b59063f 100644 > --- a/init/Kconfig > +++ b/init/Kconfig > @@ -1929,6 +1929,22 @@ config PROFILING > config TRACEPOINTS > bool > > +# > +# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state > +# is called. > +# > +config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE > + bool > + > +config VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG > + bool "Halt on incorrect state on returning to user-mode" > + default n > + help > + By default a warning is logged and the state is fixed. This option > + crashes the kernel instead. > + > + If unsure, say Y. > + > source "arch/Kconfig" > > endmenu # General setup > diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c > index 196c7134bee6..cc2ebf7fae55 100644 > --- a/kernel/sys.c > +++ b/kernel/sys.c > @@ -2459,3 +2459,14 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) > return 0; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ > + > +/* Called before coming back to user-mode */ > +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG > + BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)); > +#else > + if (WARN_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS))) > + set_fs(USER_DS); > +#endif I would just make this: if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)) set_fs(USER_DS); -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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