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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJJ72w+uGKf90DR-uY6VTOVF3QKV9_1bLUsucs_zg4uAA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 16:44:04 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: James Morse <james.morse@....com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Pratyush Anand <panand@...hat.com>, keun-o.park@...kmatter.ae
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64/uaccess: Add hardened usercopy check for bad
stack accesses
On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 10:29 AM, James Morse <james.morse@....com> wrote:
> lkdtm tests copy_{to,from}_user() by trying to copy an address range
> on the stack that isn't yet part of a stack frame.
>
> By the time the stack walker is invoked to check that the object being
> copied doesn't overlap stack frame, the invalid range is part of a valid
> stack frame. Discarding a constant number of frames is fragile as different
> compiler versions may make different inline choices.
>
> Instead, add a check that the object isn't between the current stack
> pointer and the end of the stack. Add this early enough that it should
> be inlined into the caller.
>
> CC: Sahara <keun-o.park@...kmatter.ae>
> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@....com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 46da3ea638bb..d3494840a61c 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -356,6 +356,22 @@ do { \
> -EFAULT; \
> })
>
> +static inline void check_obj_in_unused_stack(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
> +{
> + unsigned long stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current);
> +
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(len) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY) || !len)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * If current_stack_pointer is on the task stack, obj must not lie
> + * between current_stack_pointer and the last stack address.
> + */
> + if ((current_stack_pointer & ~(THREAD_SIZE-1)) == stack)
> + BUG_ON(stack <= (unsigned long)obj &&
> + (unsigned long)obj < current_stack_pointer);
> +}
It seems like this would be a valid test on all architecture, yes? I
wonder if this could be reworked so we don't have a special case for
ARM here...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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