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Message-ID: <70a9cb32-471e-9827-fae6-cd46a40c87b1@giassa.net> Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 19:31:57 -0800 From: Matthew Giassa <matthew@...ssa.net> To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com> Cc: Jidong Xiao <jidong.xiao@...il.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, KVM <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> Subject: Re: Introduction + new project: "rootkit detection using virtualization". On 2017-02-14 01:25 PM, Steve Rutherford wrote: > On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:06 AM, Matthew Giassa <matthew@...ssa.net> wrote: >> Hi Jidong, >> >> You are correct on all the points noted above:My goal is to develop a >> production-ready, non-academic implementation of such a tool. I'm in >> it for the long haul. > Is your goal for this to work on all architectures, or are you > planning to focus on Intel-x86 (or AMD-x86, or ARM, or...)? >> >> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 7:43 PM, Jidong Xiao <jidong.xiao@...il.com> wrote: >>> Thanks Matthew. So if I understand correctly, even though many people have >>> proposed similar solutions, none of them have actually contributed their >>> code (of their solution) into Qemu/KVM. To make it "real" (i.e., as a part >>> of Qemu/KVM code) is your goal, right? That sounds interesting! >>> >>> -Jidong >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 8:21 PM, Matthew Giassa <matthew@...ssa.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 2017-02-10 03:18 PM, Jidong Xiao wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Sorry, I have to resend this again, as the original two emails were >>>>> blocked because of the url. >>>>> >>>>> "Rootkit detection using virtualization" has been widely studied for a >>>>> decade. Is the approach you are going to use different from all of these >>>>> existing ones: >>>>> >>>>> "Survey: Virtual Machine Introspection Based System Monitoring and >>>>> Malware Detection Techniques" - by Haofu Liao at University of Rochester. >>>>> >>>>> -Jidong >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2017-02-10 05:37 PM, Rik van Riel wrote: >>>>> >>>>> One of the things that Matthew can do is build on >>>>> the read-only memory protections in the kernel, and >>>>> have the hypervisor enforce that the memory the kernel >>>>> marks as read-only is never written from inside the >>>>> virtual machine, until the next reboot. >>>>> >>>>> That seems like it might be a useful place to start, >>>>> since it would immediately make the other read-only >>>>> protections that people are working on much harder to >>>>> get around, at least inside virtual machines. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> My initial plan was to start with what Rik proposed, and focus on >>>> additional memory protections. With respect to long-term plans, a lot of my >>>> work/research so far has been focused on implementing a system similar to >>>> that presented by Payne et al (ie: Lares). >>>> >>>> -Matthew Giassa >>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> ============================================================ >> Matthew Giassa, MASc, BASc, EIT >> Principal Developer; Security and Embedded Systems Specialist >> linkedin: https://ca.linkedin.com/in/giassa >> e-mail: matthew@...ssa.net >> website: www.giassa.net My initial aim is x86/x64 targets, unless there are additional resources I can tap into for expanding to ARM. If I can get a working prototype up and running and into "staging", then expanding to ARM architecture would be viable.
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