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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLHzvL_ryFYZJjLJ8qVEWS+yLHW-nK+SKFt2GwNorvjeA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 09:21:23 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [RFC v2 PATCH 0/2] security: mark LSM hooks with __ro_after_init On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 5:15 AM, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote: > Updated and simplified down to two patches. > > Following feedback from the list, I've added a new config option to handle > the case where SELinux still needs to disable its hooks at runtime (and > thus the hooks must be writable in that case). > > I've dropped the Netfilter hooks patch as I realized that the hook ops > list structures could be modified after init by the core NF code. > > The SELinux Netlink message patch has been merged, and Mimi is reviewing > the IMA default policy patch (it's not affected by LSM hook requirements > and can be merged separately). > > --- > > James Morris (2): > security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS > security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init Please consider these both: Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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