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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJV7qi1LeyBfZS6ppJ=ih7nTnx4Rr8tyvC-ziiJu-OszQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 12:06:37 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: %pK continuation
On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 11:50 AM, Roberts, William C
<william.c.roberts@...el.com> wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: keescook@...gle.com [mailto:keescook@...gle.com] On Behalf Of Kees
>> Cook
>> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 3:42 PM
>> To: Roberts, William C <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
>> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
>> Subject: Re: %pK continuation
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Roberts, William C
>> <william.c.roberts@...el.com> wrote:
>> > I haven't had time to really work on the continuation of:
>> > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/10/07/1
>> >
>> > I think the simple approach of killing %p based on kptr_restrict
>> > remains the simplest, IMHO best way to achieve a better level of preventing
>> leaks of kernel addresses. In example of %pK going wrong can be found here:
>> > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/02/lifting-hyper-visor-
>> bypassing-samsungs.html.
>>
>> There's been some experimentation in Android kernels recently based on your
>> original version, though it's not quite ready for prime-time. I'm hoping to see it
>> posted to this list soon...
>
> Oh really, do you have any links to those patches?
Not yet, but hopefully soon. I'll get them posted as soon as I have them.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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