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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+fkuY3VaGSXT3f9AygLzVzKdDSKjJsFvQrh=vF7wmWfA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 10:16:14 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 3:31 PM, Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org> wrote:
> Provide a mechansim for other functions to verify that their arguments
> are read-only. This implements the first half of a suggestion made by
> Kees Cook for the Kernel Self Protection Project:
>
> * provide mechanism to check for ro_after_init memory areas, and
> reject structures not marked ro_after_init in vmbus_register()
>
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/02/04/1
Awesome! I'd add the third patch too (to have vmbus_register() do the
check), just to have an example in the series.
> I have succesfully compiled this series on next-20170206 for x86. I am
> not sure how to go about testing these changes (perhpas with LKDTM?).
Hmm. LKDTM doesn't seem quite right since it's expecting to trip a
kernel self-protection check of some kind (and already has an
ro_after_init check). I think just adding users of this is a
sufficient test (i.e. vmbus_register()), since the ro_after_init
infrastructure is already being tested.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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