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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1702131625430.8914@namei.org> Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 16:31:40 +1100 (AEDT) From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/4] ro hardening for the security subsystem Hi Folks, Please review/test these patches which add some read-only hardening to the security subsystem. In this series, the following are marked as __ro_after_init: - LSM hooks - Netfilter hooks used by security/ - the default IMA rules I've also constified the SELinux Netlink permission tables, which will ensure they're located in an RO section. --- James Morris (4): security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init security: mark nf ops in SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_init selinux: constify nlmsg permission tables security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 8 ++++---- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 10 +++++----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 2 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) -- James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
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