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Message-Id: <20170212233140.10606-1-ewk@edkovsky.org>
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2017 16:31:38 -0700
From: Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>
To: jeyu@...hat.com,
rusty@...tcorp.com.au,
keescook@...omium.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Eddie Kovsky <ewk@...ovsky.org>
Subject: [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
Provide a mechansim for other functions to verify that their arguments
are read-only. This implements the first half of a suggestion made by
Kees Cook for the Kernel Self Protection Project:
* provide mechanism to check for ro_after_init memory areas, and
reject structures not marked ro_after_init in vmbus_register()
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/02/04/1
I have succesfully compiled this series on next-20170206 for x86. I am
not sure how to go about testing these changes (perhpas with LKDTM?).
Eddie Kovsky (2):
[RFC] [PATCH 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
[RFC] [PATCH 2/2] extable: verify address is read-only
include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++
include/linux/module.h | 2 ++
kernel/extable.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
--
2.11.1
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