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Message-ID: <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC562305B2AC@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 19:02:42 +0000 From: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com> To: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Subject: %pK continuation I haven't had time to really work on the continuation of: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/10/07/1 I think the simple approach of killing %p based on kptr_restrict remains the simplest, IMHO best way to achieve a better level of preventing leaks of kernel addresses. In example of %pK going wrong can be found here: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/02/lifting-hyper-visor-bypassing-samsungs.html. Granted, the exploit author would have found another way to defeat KASL, I'd like to force their hand. In a nut shell, the driver use %pk instead of %pK (capitalization of K matters). This would actually be a good checkpatch.pl check. I grep'd the kernel for %pk (lower case k) and found no usages! Just passing along some thoughts, Bill
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