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Message-ID: <20170119075341.GA14530@amd>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 08:53:41 +0100
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@...driver.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...isc-linux.org>,
	Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	x86@...nel.org, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security: Change name of CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA

On Wed 2017-01-18 17:29:05, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, this kernel option
> provides key security features that are to be expected on a modern
> system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS which more
> accurately describes what this option is intended to do.

I think this is bad change. CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is describing what it
does, CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS is advertising.

We don't do advertising, and we don't force people to re-answer the
config questions without good reason.

CONFIG_HARDENED_RODATA might fix the first problem, but not the second
one.

								Pavel
								

> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl            |  8 ++++----
>  Documentation/security/self-protection.txt |  2 +-
>  arch/arm/Kconfig                           |  1 +
>  arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig       |  2 +-
>  arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig       |  2 +-
>  arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h          |  2 +-
>  arch/arm/kernel/patch.c                    |  2 +-
>  arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S              |  8 ++++----
>  arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                        | 14 +-------------
>  arch/arm/mm/init.c                         |  4 ++--
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig                         |  4 +---
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug                   |  2 +-
>  arch/parisc/Kconfig                        |  1 +
>  arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug                  | 11 -----------
>  arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig          |  2 +-
>  arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig        |  2 +-
>  arch/parisc/mm/init.c                      |  2 +-
>  arch/s390/Kconfig                          |  4 +---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                           |  4 +---
>  include/linux/init.h                       |  4 ++--
>  init/main.c                                |  4 ++--
>  kernel/configs/android-recommended.config  |  2 +-
>  kernel/power/hibernate.c                   |  2 +-
>  kernel/power/power.h                       |  4 ++--
>  kernel/power/snapshot.c                    |  4 ++--
>  security/Kconfig                           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  26 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl b/Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl
> index f3abca7..a79b638 100644
> --- a/Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl
> +++ b/Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl
> @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@
>      </para>
>      <para>
>      If the architecture that you are using supports the kernel option
> -    CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, you should consider turning it off.  This
> +    CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS, you should consider turning it off.  This
>      option will prevent the use of software breakpoints because it
>      marks certain regions of the kernel's memory space as read-only.
>      If kgdb supports it for the architecture you are using, you can
>      use hardware breakpoints if you desire to run with the
> -    CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option turned on, else you need to turn off
> +    CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS option turned on, else you need to turn off
>      this option.
>      </para>
>      <para>
> @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
>      <para>Here is an example set of .config symbols to enable or
>      disable for kgdb:
>      <itemizedlist>
> -    <listitem><para># CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is not set</para></listitem>
> +    <listitem><para># CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS is not set</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB=y</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y</para></listitem>
> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
>      </para>
>      <para>Here is an example set of .config symbols to enable/disable kdb:
>      <itemizedlist>
> -    <listitem><para># CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is not set</para></listitem>
> +    <listitem><para># CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS is not set</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB=y</para></listitem>
>      <listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y</para></listitem>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt b/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
> index 3010576..da8cb36 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ kernel, they are implemented in a way where the memory is temporarily
>  made writable during the update, and then returned to the original
>  permissions.)
>  
> -In support of this are (the poorly named) CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
> +In support of this are CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS and
>  CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, which seek to make sure that code is not
>  writable, data is not executable, and read-only data is neither writable
>  nor executable.
> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> index 186c4c2..09aff28 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config ARM
>  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
>  	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
>  	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
>  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
>  	select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
> diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
> index ca39c04..8ccc216 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=y
>  # CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7 is not set
>  CONFIG_ARCH_ASPEED=y
>  CONFIG_MACH_ASPEED_G4=y
> -CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
> +CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS=y
>  CONFIG_AEABI=y
>  CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY=y
>  CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
> diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
> index 4f366b0..90c5ce4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V6=y
>  # CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7 is not set
>  CONFIG_ARCH_ASPEED=y
>  CONFIG_MACH_ASPEED_G5=y
> -CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
> +CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS=y
>  CONFIG_AEABI=y
>  CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY=y
>  CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> index bdd283b..c3a7a72 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
>  static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
>  void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
>  #else
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> index 69bda1a..9da1bf5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
>  
>  	if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
>  		page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> -	else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA))
> +	else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS))
>  		page = virt_to_page(addr);
>  	else
>  		return addr;
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> index f7f55df..5c6a2e8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  		HEAD_TEXT
>  	}
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  
>  	NOTES
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
>  #else
>  	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
> @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  	PERCPU_SECTION(L1_CACHE_BYTES)
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
>  #else
>  	. = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);
> @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  	STABS_DEBUG
>  }
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  /*
>   * Without CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA, __start_rodata_section_aligned will
>   * be the first section-aligned location after __start_rodata. Otherwise,
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> index f68e8ec..e770dc9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> @@ -1051,21 +1051,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_BIG_ENDIAN
>  	  This option specifies the architecture can support big endian
>  	  operation.
>  
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> -	bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
> -	depends on MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
> -	default y if CPU_V7
> -	help
> -	  If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made
> -	  read-only, and non-text kernel memory will be made non-executable.
> -	  The tradeoff is that each region is padded to section-size (1MiB)
> -	  boundaries (because their permissions are different and splitting
> -	  the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB performance problems), which
> -	  can waste memory.
> -
>  config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
>  	bool "Make rodata strictly non-executable"
> -	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
> +	depends on HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  	default y
>  	help
>  	  If this is set, rodata will be made explicitly non-executable. This
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> index 370581a..303bee4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  struct section_perm {
>  	const char *name;
>  	unsigned long start;
> @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
>  
>  #else
>  static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
> -#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS */
>  
>  void free_tcmmem(void)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 1117421..06fed56 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config ARM64
>  	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
> @@ -123,9 +124,6 @@ config ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
>  config MMU
>  	def_bool y
>  
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> -	def_bool y
> -
>  config ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT
>  	int
>  	default 16 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> index d1ebd46..a26d27f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>  	  If in doubt, say Y.
>  
>  config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
> -	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
> +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"
>  	help
>  	  If this option is enabled, sections that may potentially be marked as
> diff --git a/arch/parisc/Kconfig b/arch/parisc/Kconfig
> index 3a71f38..7c73eaa 100644
> --- a/arch/parisc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/parisc/Kconfig
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config PARISC
>  	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
>  	select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	select RTC_CLASS
>  	select RTC_DRV_GENERIC
>  	select INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
> diff --git a/arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug b/arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug
> index 68b7cbd..0d856b9 100644
> --- a/arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -5,15 +5,4 @@ source "lib/Kconfig.debug"
>  config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
>  	def_bool y
>  
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> -       bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
> -       depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
> -       default y
> -       help
> -         Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
> -         in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
> -         data. This option may have a slight performance impact because a
> -         portion of the kernel code won't be covered by a TLB anymore.
> -         If in doubt, say "N".
> -
>  endmenu
> diff --git a/arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig b/arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig
> index db8f56b..f1a4732 100644
> --- a/arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig
> +++ b/arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig
> @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
>  CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
>  CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y
>  # CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_DETECTOR is not set
> -CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
> +CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS=y
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL=m
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
> diff --git a/arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig b/arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig
> index fb92b89..03e88e2 100644
> --- a/arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig
> +++ b/arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig
> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
>  CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y
>  # CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
>  # CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_DETECTOR is not set
> -CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
> +CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS=y
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL=m
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
>  CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=m
> diff --git a/arch/parisc/mm/init.c b/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
> index e02ada3..f76f8ad 100644
> --- a/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
> @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ void free_initmem(void)
>  }
>  
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  void mark_rodata_ro(void)
>  {
>  	/* rodata memory was already mapped with KERNEL_RO access rights by
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> index c6722112..8e70ae5 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -62,15 +62,13 @@ config PCI_QUIRKS
>  config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
>  	def_bool y
>  
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> -	def_bool y
> -
>  config S390
>  	def_bool y
>  	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
>  	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>  	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index e487493..9d80cd8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ config X86
>  	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
>  	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
>  	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
> @@ -309,9 +310,6 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
>  config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
>  	def_bool y
>  
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> -	def_bool y
> -
>  config PGTABLE_LEVELS
>  	int
>  	default 4 if X86_64
> diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
> index 885c3e6..9967bc9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/init.h
> +++ b/include/linux/init.h
> @@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ void prepare_namespace(void);
>  void __init load_default_modules(void);
>  int __init init_rootfs(void);
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
> +#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
>  extern bool rodata_enabled;
>  #endif
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  void mark_rodata_ro(void);
>  #endif
>  
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> index b0c9d6f..4b3bcc4 100644
> --- a/init/main.c
> +++ b/init/main.c
> @@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int try_to_run_init_process(const char *init_filename)
>  
>  static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void);
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
> +#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
>  bool rodata_enabled __ro_after_init = true;
>  static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
>  {
> @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
>  __setup("rodata=", set_debug_rodata);
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  static void mark_readonly(void)
>  {
>  	if (rodata_enabled)
> diff --git a/kernel/configs/android-recommended.config b/kernel/configs/android-recommended.config
> index 297756b..b796bc8 100644
> --- a/kernel/configs/android-recommended.config
> +++ b/kernel/configs/android-recommended.config
> @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y
>  CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=y
>  CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM_SIZE=8192
>  CONFIG_COMPACTION=y
> -CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
> +CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS=y
>  CONFIG_DM_CRYPT=y
>  CONFIG_DM_UEVENT=y
>  CONFIG_DM_VERITY=y
> diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> index b26dbc4..f7a3ea3 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> @@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static int __init hibernate_setup(char *str)
>  	} else if (!strncmp(str, "no", 2)) {
>  		noresume = 1;
>  		nohibernate = 1;
> -	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
> +	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS)
>  		   && !strncmp(str, "protect_image", 13)) {
>  		enable_restore_image_protection();
>  	}
> diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> index 1dfa0da..dc2c7b8 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> @@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ extern int hibernation_snapshot(int platform_mode);
>  extern int hibernation_restore(int platform_mode);
>  extern int hibernation_platform_enter(void);
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  /* kernel/power/snapshot.c */
>  extern void enable_restore_image_protection(void);
>  #else
>  static inline void enable_restore_image_protection(void) {}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS */
>  
>  #else /* !CONFIG_HIBERNATION */
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> index 2d8e2b2..a7c793e 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
>  
>  #include "power.h"
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  static bool hibernate_restore_protection;
>  static bool hibernate_restore_protection_active;
>  
> @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_protection_begin(void) {}
>  static inline void hibernate_restore_protection_end(void) {}
>  static inline void hibernate_restore_protect_page(void *page_address) {}
>  static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS */
>  
>  static int swsusp_page_is_free(struct page *);
>  static void swsusp_set_page_forbidden(struct page *);
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 118f454..ad6ce82 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -158,6 +158,22 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
>  	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
>  	  trying to find such users.
>  
> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	def_bool n
> +
> +config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
> +	bool "Mark kernel mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> +	default y
> +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	help
> +          If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> +	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> +	  protection against certain security attacks (e.g. executing the heap
> +	  or modifying text).
> +
> +	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> +	  is recommended to say Y here.
> +
>  source security/selinux/Kconfig
>  source security/smack/Kconfig
>  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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