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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJxDAZJZtVCHX+RmLUHz8s4ZxBPvYadpswmZwjvCmjFEw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 13:57:52 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@...driver.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...isc-linux.org>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
linux-parisc <linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-s390@...r.kernel.org" <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>, Linux PM list <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security: Change name of CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 5:29 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, this kernel option
> provides key security features that are to be expected on a modern
> system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS which more
> accurately describes what this option is intended to do.
Oh thank you. Yes, this is badly needed. I might prefer to see this as
two patches, though:
Move DEBUG_RODATA to top-level arch/Kconfig, (and add ARCH_HAS_[bikeshed]).
Rename DEBUG_RODATA to [bikeshed]
(We should do a similar renaming for DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX too.)
Another thing that might be even cleaner would be to entirely invert
the logic. Something like CONFIG_ARCH_MISSING_[bikeshed]?
> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> index 186c4c2..09aff28 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config ARM
> select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
> select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
> select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
> + select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
> select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
> select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
> select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> index f68e8ec..e770dc9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> @@ -1051,21 +1051,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_BIG_ENDIAN
> This option specifies the architecture can support big endian
> operation.
>
> -config DEBUG_RODATA
> - bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
> - depends on MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
> - default y if CPU_V7
These changes aren't correctly representing the ARM state. I think the
ARCH_HAS is correct, but I'm not sure the best way to include the
"default y if CPU_V7".
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -158,6 +158,22 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
> been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
> trying to find such users.
>
> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> + def_bool n
> +
> +config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
> + bool "Mark kernel mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> + default y
> + depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> + help
> + If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> + and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> + protection against certain security attacks (e.g. executing the heap
> + or modifying text).
> +
> + Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> + is recommended to say Y here.
> +
> source security/selinux/Kconfig
> source security/smack/Kconfig
> source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
Should this go in arch/Kconfig or security/Kconfig? I'm starting to
think we need a top-level kernel security Kconfig (the gcc plugins are
starting to pile up in arch/Kconfig, for example). I think since this
is arch specific, maybe arch/Kconfig? (Arguably, HARDENED_USERCOPY
shouldn't be in security/Kconfig either, since security/Kconfig is
mostly LSM or userspace-facing stuff? I dunno.)
As for the bikeshed on the naming, I like "KERNEL_RWX", and it likely
doesn't need "STRICT", IMO. CONFIG_KERNEL_RWX ? I don't have a strong
opinion beyond removing "DEBUG" from the name. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
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