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Message-Id: <1484730707-29313-12-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 11:11:40 +0200
From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: keescook@...omium.org,
arnd@...db.de,
tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com,
h.peter.anvin@...el.com,
peterz@...radead.org,
will.deacon@....com,
dwindsor@...il.com,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@...il.com>
Subject: [RFCv2 PATCH 11/18] security: convert from atomic_t to refcount_t
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. Convert the cases found.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
include/linux/key.h | 5 +++--
security/keys/gc.c | 2 +-
security/keys/internal.h | 3 ++-
security/keys/key.c | 12 ++++++------
security/keys/keyring.c | 8 ++++----
security/keys/proc.c | 4 ++--
security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 +-
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++----
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 5 +++--
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 11 ++++++-----
security/tomoyo/common.c | 11 ++++++-----
12 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 7229147..43d468e 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ static inline bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
* - Kerberos TGTs and tickets
*/
struct key {
- atomic_t usage; /* number of references */
+ refcount_t usage; /* number of references */
key_serial_t serial; /* key serial number */
union {
struct list_head graveyard_link;
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ extern void key_put(struct key *key);
static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key)
{
- atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+ refcount_inc(&key->usage);
return key;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index addf060..4478925 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
key = rb_entry(cursor, struct key, serial_node);
cursor = rb_next(cursor);
- if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
+ if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
goto found_unreferenced_key;
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1)) {
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a705a7d..110d661 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
struct iovec;
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ struct key_user {
struct rb_node node;
struct mutex cons_lock; /* construction initiation lock */
spinlock_t lock;
- atomic_t usage; /* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */
+ refcount_t usage; /* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */
atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */
atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */
kuid_t uid;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 346fbf2..b4958b3 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
* second pass - so we use the candidate record */
- atomic_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
+ refcount_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
candidate->uid = uid;
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
found:
- atomic_inc(&user->usage);
+ refcount_inc(&user->usage);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
kfree(candidate);
out:
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
*/
void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
{
- if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
+ if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
- atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
+ refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ void key_put(struct key *key)
if (key) {
key_check(key);
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage))
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&key->usage))
schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
}
}
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
found:
/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
- if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
+ if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
goto not_found;
/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index c91e4e0..3d95f7d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
- if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
goto out;
@@ -1250,14 +1250,14 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
int ret;
- kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
+ kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
key_check(keyring);
key_check(key);
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
if (ret == 0) {
- kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
+ kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
ret = __key_link_check_restriction(keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
}
- kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
+ kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index b9f531c..bf08d02 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
- atomic_read(&key->usage),
+ refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_printf(m, "%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\n",
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),
- atomic_read(&user->usage),
+ refcount_read(&user->usage),
atomic_read(&user->nkeys),
atomic_read(&user->nikeys),
user->qnkeys,
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 918cddc..16877c5 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);
/* The root user's tracking struct */
struct key_user root_key_user = {
- .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(3),
.cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
.nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 6bbe2f5..0f06215 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_inst;
- kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
+ kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c7c6619..1241b07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@
#include "avc_ss.h"
/* SECMARK reference count */
-static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+static refcount_t selinux_secmark_refcount = REFCOUNT_INIT(0);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
int selinux_enforcing;
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
*/
static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
{
- return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+ return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || refcount_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
}
/**
@@ -4915,12 +4916,12 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
{
- atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+ refcount_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
}
static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
{
- atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+ refcount_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 1450f85..182dc95 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
@@ -28,11 +29,11 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
const struct flowi *fl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
+extern refcount_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
{
- return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
+ return (refcount_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
}
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 56e354f..f485965 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -44,13 +44,14 @@
#include <net/checksum.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
-atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+refcount_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = REFCOUNT_INIT(0);
/*
* Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
goto err;
*ctxp = ctx;
- atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ refcount_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
return 0;
err:
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
if (!ctx)
return;
- atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ refcount_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
kfree(ctx);
}
@@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ refcount_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
return 0;
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
x->security = ctx;
- atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ refcount_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
out:
kfree(ctx_str);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index e0fb750..9a7605a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include "common.h"
/* String table for operation mode. */
@@ -1907,7 +1908,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tomoyo_query_list_lock);
* Number of "struct file" referring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query
* interface.
*/
-static atomic_t tomoyo_query_observers = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+static refcount_t tomoyo_query_observers = REFCOUNT_INIT(0);
/**
* tomoyo_truncate - Truncate a line.
@@ -2015,7 +2016,7 @@ int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
switch (r->mode) {
case TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING:
error = -EPERM;
- if (atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers))
+ if (refcount_read(&tomoyo_query_observers))
break;
goto out;
case TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING:
@@ -2059,7 +2060,7 @@ int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
wake_up_all(&tomoyo_query_wait);
if (wait_event_interruptible_timeout
(tomoyo_answer_wait, entry.answer ||
- !atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers), HZ))
+ !refcount_read(&tomoyo_query_observers), HZ))
break;
else
entry.timer++;
@@ -2437,7 +2438,7 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
* there is some process monitoring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query.
*/
if (type == TOMOYO_QUERY)
- atomic_inc(&tomoyo_query_observers);
+ refcount_inc(&tomoyo_query_observers);
file->private_data = head;
tomoyo_notify_gc(head, true);
return 0;
@@ -2687,7 +2688,7 @@ void tomoyo_close_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
* observer counter.
*/
if (head->type == TOMOYO_QUERY &&
- atomic_dec_and_test(&tomoyo_query_observers))
+ refcount_dec_and_test(&tomoyo_query_observers))
wake_up_all(&tomoyo_answer_wait);
tomoyo_notify_gc(head, false);
}
--
2.7.4
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