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Message-ID: <20170113082347.GJ20972@linaro.org> Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:23:48 +0900 From: "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org> To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> Cc: park jinbum <jinb.park7@...il.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Subject: Re: Introduction On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 04:06:02PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote: > On Fri, Jan 13, 2017 at 12:06:31AM +0900, park jinbum wrote: > > Hello All, > > Hi, > > > I'd like to contribute to kernel self protection project. > > I've experienced ARM kernel, security solution on production. > > (kernel memory protection, contents protection, ...) > > > > I'm interested in following topics. > > - Move kernel stack to vmap area (done on x86, other archs still need it) > > FWIW, I'm looking at this for arm64 (and Takahiro-san is also looking at > this area). Making the stacks virtually mapped is fairly trivial, but > implementing reliable {under,over}flow handling is fairly involved. > > 32-bit ARM is also somewhat starved for vmalloc space, so ignoring the > difficulties in exception handling changes, I'm not sure that's going to > be widely deployable. > > I believe it should be possible to implement THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK for arm > similarly to arm64, which would bring some benefit regardless. > > Takahiro-san, were you looking into that at all? No, never. I'm currently taking a quick look at PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK and PAX_MEMORY_STRUCTLEAK (on both arm64 and x86 though arch-specific portion of code is quite small). -Takahiro AKASHI > > - KASLR for ARM > > Given the small amount of VA space on 32-bit, and the potential of > kernel addresses to be determined by other means, I'm not sure that > there's much gain from this relative to the work involved. > > > - protect ARM vector table as fixed-location kernel target > > I'm not exactly sure what this means (I see it was taken from the KSPP > todo list?). Kees -- did you have a specific idea here? > > On cores with VBAR, the vectors can be moved, so it might be possible to > dynamically allocate them at a random position. Otherwise, I was under > the impression that this was RO with DEBUG_RODATA selected. > > ... on that note, mandating DEBUG_RODATA for 32-bit ARM would be a good > step forward. > > Thanks, > Mark.
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