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Message-ID: <CAHmME9oEhmqW3320Ch+Rczu_=CxQyUQXCGLnYjDm-CYbWugnSw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 23:18:48 +0100 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> To: George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>, "Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>, Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 11:13 PM, George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net> wrote: > Remembering that on "real" machines it's full SipHash, then I'd say that > 64-bit security + rekeying seems reasonable. 64-bit security for an RNG is not reasonable even with rekeying. No no no. Considering we already have a massive speed-up here with the secure version, there's zero reason to start weakening the security because we're trigger happy with our benchmarks. No no no.
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