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Message-ID: <CALx6S35UgTyqkYUjS5gYFH4HnjW974WQ_JiDXxgb9rZ7gnY52Q@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 11:18:02 -0800 From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com> To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> Cc: Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>, "Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] siphash: add cryptographically secure hashtable function On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote: > SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a > cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast, > and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function. > "super fast" is relative. My quick test shows that this faster than Toeplitz (good, but not exactly hard to achieve), but is about 4x slower than jhash. > SipHash isn't just some new trendy hash function. It's been around for a > while, and there really isn't anything that comes remotely close to > being useful in the way SipHash is. With that said, why do we need this? > I don't think we need advertising nor a lesson on hashing. It would be much more useful if you just point us to the paper on siphash (which I assume I http://cr.yp.to/siphash/siphash-20120918.pdf ?). > There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an > attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the > same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is > a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. > > Linux developers already seem to be aware that this is an issue, and > various places that use hash tables in, say, a network context, use a > non-cryptographically secure function (usually jhash) and then try to > twiddle with the key on a time basis (or in many cases just do nothing > and hope that nobody notices). While this is an admirable attempt at > solving the problem, it doesn't actually fix it. SipHash fixes it. > Key rotation is important anyway, without any key rotation even if the key is compromised in siphash by some external means we would have an insecure hash until the system reboots. > (It fixes it in such a sound way that you could even build a stream > cipher out of SipHash that would resist the modern cryptanalysis.) > > There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to > hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network > vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the > moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually > getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then > we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate. > > Secondly, a few places are using MD5 for creating secure sequence > numbers, port numbers, or fast random numbers. Siphash is a faster, more > fittting, and more secure replacement for MD5 in those situations. > > Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash > tables. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is > a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known problem, and it's > time we catch-up. > Maybe so, but we need to do due diligence before considering adopting siphash as the primary hashing in the network stack. Consider that we may very well perform a hash over L4 tuples on _every_ packet. We've done a good job at limiting this to be at most one hash per packet, but nevertheless the performance of the hash function must be take into account. A few points: 1) My quick test shows siphash is about four times more expensive than jhash. On my test system, computing a hash over IPv4 tuple (two 32 bit addresses and 2 16 bit source ports) is 6.9 nsecs in Jenkins hash, 33 nsecs with siphash. Given that we have eliminated most of the packet header hashes this might be tolerable, but still should be looking at ways to optimize. 2) I like moving to use u64 (quad words) in the hash, this is an improvement over Jenkins which is based on 32 bit words. If we put this in the kernel we probably want to have several variants of siphash for specific sizes (e.g. siphash1, siphash2, siphash2, siphashn for hash over one, two, three, or n sixty four bit words). 3) I also tested siphash distribution and Avalanche Effect (these really should have been covered in the paper :-( ). Both of these are good with siphash, in fact almost have identical characteristics to Jenkins hash. Tom > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com> > Cc: Daniel J. Bernstein <djb@...yp.to> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> > Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> > Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> > --- > Changes from v2->v3: > > - There is now a fast aligned version of the function and a not-as-fast > unaligned version. The requirements for each have been documented in > a docbook-style comment. As well, the header now contains a constant > for the expected alignment. > > - The test suite has been updated to check both the unaligned and aligned > version of the function. > > include/linux/siphash.h | 30 ++++++++++ > lib/Kconfig.debug | 6 +- > lib/Makefile | 5 +- > lib/siphash.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > lib/test_siphash.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/linux/siphash.h > create mode 100644 lib/siphash.c > create mode 100644 lib/test_siphash.c > > diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..82dc1a911a2e > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/linux/siphash.h > @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ > +/* Copyright (C) 2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> > + * > + * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license. > + * > + * SipHash: a fast short-input PRF > + * https://131002.net/siphash/ > + */ > + > +#ifndef _LINUX_SIPHASH_H > +#define _LINUX_SIPHASH_H > + > +#include <linux/types.h> > + > +enum siphash_lengths { > + SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN = 16, > + SIPHASH24_ALIGNMENT = 8 > +}; > + > +u64 siphash24(const u8 *data, size_t len, const u8 key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS > +static inline u64 siphash24_unaligned(const u8 *data, size_t len, const u8 key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]) > +{ > + return siphash24(data, len, key); > +} > +#else > +u64 siphash24_unaligned(const u8 *data, size_t len, const u8 key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]); > +#endif > + > +#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */ > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug > index e6327d102184..32bbf689fc46 100644 > --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug > @@ -1843,9 +1843,9 @@ config TEST_HASH > tristate "Perform selftest on hash functions" > default n > help > - Enable this option to test the kernel's integer (<linux/hash,h>) > - and string (<linux/stringhash.h>) hash functions on boot > - (or module load). > + Enable this option to test the kernel's integer (<linux/hash.h>), > + string (<linux/stringhash.h>), and siphash (<linux/siphash.h>) > + hash functions on boot (or module load). > > This is intended to help people writing architecture-specific > optimized versions. If unsure, say N. > diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile > index 50144a3aeebd..71d398b04a74 100644 > --- a/lib/Makefile > +++ b/lib/Makefile > @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ > sha1.o chacha20.o md5.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \ > flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \ > is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \ > - earlycpio.o seq_buf.o nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o > + earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o \ > + nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o > > lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o > lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o > @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HEXDUMP) += test_hexdump.o > obj-y += kstrtox.o > obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BPF) += test_bpf.o > obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FIRMWARE) += test_firmware.o > -obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HASH) += test_hash.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HASH) += test_hash.o test_siphash.o > obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KASAN) += test_kasan.o > obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KSTRTOX) += test-kstrtox.o > obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LKM) += test_module.o > diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..32acdc26234f > --- /dev/null > +++ b/lib/siphash.c > @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ > +/* Copyright (C) 2015-2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> > + * Copyright (C) 2012-2014 Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com> > + * Copyright (C) 2012-2014 Daniel J. Bernstein <djb@...yp.to> > + * > + * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license. > + * > + * SipHash: a fast short-input PRF > + * https://131002.net/siphash/ > + */ > + > +#include <linux/siphash.h> > +#include <linux/kernel.h> > +#include <asm/unaligned.h> > + > +#if defined(CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS) && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 > +#include <linux/dcache.h> > +#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h> > +#endif > + > +#define SIPROUND \ > + do { \ > + v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \ > + v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \ > + v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \ > + v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \ > + } while(0) > + > +static inline u16 le16_to_cpuvp(const void *p) > +{ > + return le16_to_cpup(p); > +} > +static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const void *p) > +{ > + return le32_to_cpup(p); > +} > +static inline u64 le64_to_cpuvp(const void *p) > +{ > + return le64_to_cpup(p); > +} > + > +/** > + * siphash24 - compute 64-bit siphash24 PRF value > + * @data: buffer to hash, must be aligned to SIPHASH24_ALIGNMENT > + * @size: size of @data > + * @key: key buffer of size SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN, must be aligned to SIPHASH24_ALIGNMENT > + */ > +u64 siphash24(const u8 *data, size_t len, const u8 key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]) > +{ > + u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; > + u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; > + u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; > + u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; > + u64 b = ((u64)len) << 56; > + u64 k0 = le64_to_cpuvp(key); > + u64 k1 = le64_to_cpuvp(key + sizeof(u64)); > + u64 m; > + const u8 *end = data + len - (len % sizeof(u64)); > + const u8 left = len & (sizeof(u64) - 1); > + v3 ^= k1; > + v2 ^= k0; > + v1 ^= k1; > + v0 ^= k0; > + for (; data != end; data += sizeof(u64)) { > + m = le64_to_cpuvp(data); > + v3 ^= m; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + v0 ^= m; > + } > +#if defined(CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS) && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 > + if (left) > + b |= le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)(load_unaligned_zeropad(data) & bytemask_from_count(left))); > +#else > + switch (left) { > + case 7: b |= ((u64)data[6]) << 48; > + case 6: b |= ((u64)data[5]) << 40; > + case 5: b |= ((u64)data[4]) << 32; > + case 4: b |= le32_to_cpuvp(data); break; > + case 3: b |= ((u64)data[2]) << 16; > + case 2: b |= le16_to_cpuvp(data); break; > + case 1: b |= data[0]; > + } > +#endif > + v3 ^= b; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + v0 ^= b; > + v2 ^= 0xff; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(siphash24); > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS > +/** > + * siphash24 - compute 64-bit siphash24 PRF value, without alignment requirements > + * @data: buffer to hash > + * @size: size of @data > + * @key: key buffer of size SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN > + */ > +u64 siphash24_unaligned(const u8 *data, size_t len, const u8 key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]) > +{ > + u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; > + u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; > + u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; > + u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; > + u64 b = ((u64)len) << 56; > + u64 k0 = get_unaligned_le64(key); > + u64 k1 = get_unaligned_le64(key + sizeof(u64)); > + u64 m; > + const u8 *end = data + len - (len % sizeof(u64)); > + const u8 left = len & (sizeof(u64) - 1); > + v3 ^= k1; > + v2 ^= k0; > + v1 ^= k1; > + v0 ^= k0; > + for (; data != end; data += sizeof(u64)) { > + m = get_unaligned_le64(data); > + v3 ^= m; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + v0 ^= m; > + } > +#if defined(CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS) && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 > + if (left) > + b |= le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)(load_unaligned_zeropad(data) & bytemask_from_count(left))); > +#else > + switch (left) { > + case 7: b |= ((u64)data[6]) << 48; > + case 6: b |= ((u64)data[5]) << 40; > + case 5: b |= ((u64)data[4]) << 32; > + case 4: b |= get_unaligned_le32(data); break; > + case 3: b |= ((u64)data[2]) << 16; > + case 2: b |= get_unaligned_le16(data); break; > + case 1: b |= data[0]; > + } > +#endif > + v3 ^= b; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + v0 ^= b; > + v2 ^= 0xff; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + SIPROUND; > + return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(siphash24_unaligned); > +#endif > diff --git a/lib/test_siphash.c b/lib/test_siphash.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..69ac94dec366 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/lib/test_siphash.c > @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ > +/* Test cases for siphash.c > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2015-2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> > + * > + * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license. > + * > + * SipHash: a fast short-input PRF > + * https://131002.net/siphash/ > + */ > + > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt > + > +#include <linux/siphash.h> > +#include <linux/kernel.h> > +#include <linux/string.h> > +#include <linux/errno.h> > +#include <linux/module.h> > + > +/* Test vectors taken from official reference source available at: > + * https://131002.net/siphash/siphash24.c > + */ > +static const u64 test_vectors[64] = { > + 0x726fdb47dd0e0e31ULL, 0x74f839c593dc67fdULL, 0x0d6c8009d9a94f5aULL, > + 0x85676696d7fb7e2dULL, 0xcf2794e0277187b7ULL, 0x18765564cd99a68dULL, > + 0xcbc9466e58fee3ceULL, 0xab0200f58b01d137ULL, 0x93f5f5799a932462ULL, > + 0x9e0082df0ba9e4b0ULL, 0x7a5dbbc594ddb9f3ULL, 0xf4b32f46226bada7ULL, > + 0x751e8fbc860ee5fbULL, 0x14ea5627c0843d90ULL, 0xf723ca908e7af2eeULL, > + 0xa129ca6149be45e5ULL, 0x3f2acc7f57c29bdbULL, 0x699ae9f52cbe4794ULL, > + 0x4bc1b3f0968dd39cULL, 0xbb6dc91da77961bdULL, 0xbed65cf21aa2ee98ULL, > + 0xd0f2cbb02e3b67c7ULL, 0x93536795e3a33e88ULL, 0xa80c038ccd5ccec8ULL, > + 0xb8ad50c6f649af94ULL, 0xbce192de8a85b8eaULL, 0x17d835b85bbb15f3ULL, > + 0x2f2e6163076bcfadULL, 0xde4daaaca71dc9a5ULL, 0xa6a2506687956571ULL, > + 0xad87a3535c49ef28ULL, 0x32d892fad841c342ULL, 0x7127512f72f27cceULL, > + 0xa7f32346f95978e3ULL, 0x12e0b01abb051238ULL, 0x15e034d40fa197aeULL, > + 0x314dffbe0815a3b4ULL, 0x027990f029623981ULL, 0xcadcd4e59ef40c4dULL, > + 0x9abfd8766a33735cULL, 0x0e3ea96b5304a7d0ULL, 0xad0c42d6fc585992ULL, > + 0x187306c89bc215a9ULL, 0xd4a60abcf3792b95ULL, 0xf935451de4f21df2ULL, > + 0xa9538f0419755787ULL, 0xdb9acddff56ca510ULL, 0xd06c98cd5c0975ebULL, > + 0xe612a3cb9ecba951ULL, 0xc766e62cfcadaf96ULL, 0xee64435a9752fe72ULL, > + 0xa192d576b245165aULL, 0x0a8787bf8ecb74b2ULL, 0x81b3e73d20b49b6fULL, > + 0x7fa8220ba3b2eceaULL, 0x245731c13ca42499ULL, 0xb78dbfaf3a8d83bdULL, > + 0xea1ad565322a1a0bULL, 0x60e61c23a3795013ULL, 0x6606d7e446282b93ULL, > + 0x6ca4ecb15c5f91e1ULL, 0x9f626da15c9625f3ULL, 0xe51b38608ef25f57ULL, > + 0x958a324ceb064572ULL > +}; > + > +static int __init siphash_test_init(void) > +{ > + u8 in[64] __aligned(SIPHASH24_ALIGNMENT); > + u8 k[16] __aligned(SIPHASH24_ALIGNMENT); > + u8 in_unaligned[65]; > + u8 k_unaligned[65]; > + u8 i; > + int ret = 0; > + > + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { > + k[i] = i; > + k_unaligned[i + 1] = i; > + } > + for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i) { > + in[i] = i; > + in_unaligned[i + 1] = i; > + if (siphash24(in, i, k) != test_vectors[i]) { > + pr_info("self-test aligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + } > + if (siphash24_unaligned(in_unaligned + 1, i, k_unaligned + 1) != test_vectors[i]) { > + pr_info("self-test unaligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + } > + } > + if (!ret) > + pr_info("self-tests: pass\n"); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static void __exit siphash_test_exit(void) > +{ > +} > + > +module_init(siphash_test_init); > +module_exit(siphash_test_exit); > + > +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>"); > +MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); > -- > 2.11.0 >
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