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Message-ID: <87funcqicc.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 23:11:47 +0100 From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de> To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random * Daniel Micay: > On Mon, 2016-10-31 at 22:38 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: >> * Daniel Micay: >> >> > -fstack-stack is supposed to handle a single guard by default, and >> > that's all there is for thread stacks by default. >> >> Okay, then I'll really have to look at the probing offsets again. >> It's been on my to-do list since about 2012, and arguably, it *is* a >> user-space thing. > > This is concerning too: > > https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66479 Thanks. This also shows the large stack pointer decrement: subq $4144, %rsp orq $0, (%rsp) I really don't see how this can be safe with just a single guard page. > It might be prevented for VLAs by using -fsanitize=vla-bound -fsanitize- > trap=vla-bound but probably not alloca (or the older -fsanitize- > undefined-trap-on-error for GCC, since for some reason it doesn't seem > to have the new way). It's certainly reasonable to expect that this was covered by -fstack-check.
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