[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20161031205526.GA3286@pc.thejh.net>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 21:55:26 +0100
From: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
To: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary
random
On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 09:45:59PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Jann Horn:
>
> > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 09:04:02AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 7:04 AM, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net> wrote:
> >> > On machines with sizeof(unsigned long)==8, this ensures that the more
> >> > significant 32 bits of stack_canary are random, too.
> >> > stack_canary is defined as unsigned long, all the architectures with stack
> >> > protector support already pick the stack_canary of init as a random
> >> > unsigned long, and get_random_long() should be as fast as get_random_int(),
> >> > so there seems to be no good reason against this.
> >> >
> >> > This should help if someone tries to guess a stack canary with brute force.
> >> >
> >> > (This change has been made in PaX already, with a different RNG.)
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
> >>
> >> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> >>
> >> (A separate change might be to make sure that the leading byte is
> >> zeroed. Entropy of the value, I think, is less important than blocking
> >> canary exposures from unbounded str* functions. Brute forcing kernel
> >> stack canaries isn't like it bruting them in userspace...)
> >
> > Yeah, makes sense. Especially on 64bit, 56 bits of entropy ought to be
> > enough anyway.
>
> So you two approve of the way glibc does this currently? (See the
> other thread.)
Well... not really with a 32-bit canary. 2^23 crashes to defeat a
mitigation is not so much, even over the network. With a 64-bit canary,
losing the 8 bits would be no problem at all IMO.
So I guess I should revise what I said: I think the nullbyte thing is
fine for 64-bit canaries, but not for 32-bit ones.
> I was under the impression that the kernel performs far less
> null-terminated string processing the average user space application,
> especially on the stack.
Yes, that's true - the kernel allocates even small-ish temporary string
buffers with kmalloc() to reduce stack usage.
Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (820 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
