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Message-Id: <20161026065654.19166-19-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 08:56:54 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
cgroups@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC v4 18/18] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example
Add a basic sandbox tool to create a process isolated from some part of
the system. This can depend of the current cgroup.
A sandbox process can stat the directories from the root up to the
allowed files. This then allow to stat ".." in an allowed directory.
Accessing to other sibling files (not parent of allowed files), are
denied with ENOENT to forbid file names discovery by bruteforcing.
Example with the current process hierarchy (seccomp):
$ ls /home
user1
$ LANDLOCK_ALLOWED='/bin:/lib:/usr:/tmp:/proc/self/fd/0' \
./samples/landlock/sandbox /bin/sh -i
Launching a new sandboxed process.
$ ls /home
ls: cannot access '/home': No such file or directory
Example with a cgroup:
$ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed
$ ls /home
user1
$ LANDLOCK_CGROUPS='/sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed' \
LANDLOCK_ALLOWED='/bin:/lib:/usr:/tmp:/proc/self/fd/0' \
./samples/landlock/sandbox
Ready to sandbox with cgroups.
$ ls /home
user1
$ echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed/cgroup.procs
$ ls /home
ls: cannot access '/home': No such file or directory
Changes since v3:
* remove seccomp and origin field: completely free from seccomp programs
* handle more FS-related hooks
* handle inode hooks and directory traversal
* add faked but consistent view thanks to ENOENT
* add /lib64 in the example
* fix spelling
* rename some types and definitions (e.g. SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE)
Changes since v2:
* use BPF_PROG_ATTACH for cgroup handling
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
---
samples/Makefile | 2 +-
samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 +
samples/landlock/Makefile | 16 ++
samples/landlock/sandbox.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandbox.c
diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile
index e17d66d77f09..9f1b87bad1c0 100644
--- a/samples/Makefile
+++ b/samples/Makefile
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLES) += kobject/ kprobes/ trace_events/ livepatch/ \
hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/ rpmsg/ seccomp/ \
- configfs/ connector/ v4l/ trace_printk/ blackfin/
+ configfs/ connector/ v4l/ trace_printk/ blackfin/ landlock/
diff --git a/samples/landlock/.gitignore b/samples/landlock/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f6c6da930a30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/sandbox
diff --git a/samples/landlock/Makefile b/samples/landlock/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1044b2afd27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# kbuild trick to avoid linker error. Can be omitted if a module is built.
+obj- := dummy.o
+
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := sandbox
+sandbox-objs := sandbox.o
+
+always := $(hostprogs-y)
+
+HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+
+# Trick to allow make to be run from this directory
+all:
+ $(MAKE) -C ../../ $$PWD/
+
+clean:
+ $(MAKE) -C ../../ M=$$PWD clean
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandbox.c b/samples/landlock/sandbox.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a36ebdf02d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandbox.c
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Sandbox example
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 3, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h> /* open() */
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h> /* S_IFDIR() */
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "../../tools/include/linux/filter.h"
+
+#include "../bpf/libbpf.c"
+
+#ifndef seccomp
+static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int landlock_prog_load(const struct bpf_insn *insns, int prog_len,
+ enum landlock_hook hook, __u64 access)
+{
+ union bpf_attr attr = {
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK,
+ .insns = ptr_to_u64((void *) insns),
+ .insn_cnt = prog_len / sizeof(struct bpf_insn),
+ .license = ptr_to_u64((void *) "GPL"),
+ .log_buf = ptr_to_u64(bpf_log_buf),
+ .log_size = LOG_BUF_SIZE,
+ .log_level = 1,
+ .prog_subtype.landlock_rule = {
+ .hook = hook,
+ .access = access,
+ },
+ };
+
+ /* assign one field outside of struct init to make sure any
+ * padding is zero initialized
+ */
+ attr.kern_version = 0;
+
+ bpf_log_buf[0] = 0;
+
+ return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr));
+}
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof(a[0]))
+#define MAX_ERRNO 4095
+#define MAY_EXEC 0x00000001
+
+struct landlock_rule {
+ enum landlock_hook hook;
+ struct bpf_insn *bpf;
+ size_t size;
+};
+
+static int apply_sandbox(const char **allowed_paths, int path_nb, const char
+ **cgroup_paths, int cgroup_nb)
+{
+ __u32 key;
+ int i, ret = 0, map_fs = -1;
+
+ /* set up the test sandbox */
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(no_new_priv)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (path_nb) {
+ map_fs = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_ARRAY,
+ sizeof(key), sizeof(struct landlock_handle),
+ 10, 0);
+ if (map_fs < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "bpf_create_map(fs): %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ for (key = 0; key < path_nb; key++) {
+ int fd = open(allowed_paths[key],
+ O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "open(fs: \"%s\"): %s\n",
+ allowed_paths[key],
+ strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ struct landlock_handle handle = {
+ .type = BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD,
+ .fd = (__u64)fd,
+ };
+
+ /* register a new LSM handle */
+ if (bpf_update_elem(map_fs, &key, &handle, BPF_ANY)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "bpf_update_elem(fs: \"%s\"): %s\n",
+ allowed_paths[key],
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Landlock rule for file-based and path-based hooks */
+ struct bpf_insn hook_file[] = {
+ /* save context */
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ /* specify an option, if any */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* handles to compare with */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, map_fs),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR),
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath),
+ /* if the checked path is beneath the handle */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ /* allow anonymous mapping */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, -ENOENT, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ /* deny by default, if any error */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, EACCES),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+
+ /* Landlock rule for inode-based hooks */
+ struct bpf_insn hook_inode[] = {
+ /* save context */
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ /* specify an option, if any */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* handles to compare with */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, map_fs),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR),
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath),
+ /* if the checked path is beneath the handle */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+
+ /*
+ * We must allow MAY_EXEC access on directories from the root to the
+ * handles, otherwise they are not reachable.
+ */
+
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_get_fs_mode),
+ /* check if it returned an error */
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_7, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_7, MAX_ERRNO),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 2),
+ /* check if the inode is a directory */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, S_IFMT),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, S_IFDIR, 2),
+ /* no entry by default, if any error */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, ENOENT),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+
+ /* specify an option, if any */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, LANDLOCK_FLAG_OPT_REVERSE),
+ /* handles to compare with */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, map_fs),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR),
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath),
+ /* if one handle is not beneath the checked path */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, ENOENT),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+
+ /* check access mask */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[1])),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_7, MAY_EXEC, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, EACCES),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+
+ /* Landlock rule for the stat hook */
+ struct bpf_insn hook_stat[] = {
+ /* save context */
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ /* specify an option, if any */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* handles to compare with */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, map_fs),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR),
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath),
+ /* if the checked path is beneath the handle */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+
+ /*
+ * We may want to allow discovery of the directories hierarchy
+ * (from the root to the handles).
+ */
+
+ /* hook argument */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_get_fs_mode),
+ /* check if it returned an error */
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_7, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_7, MAX_ERRNO),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 2),
+ /* check if the inode is a directory */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, S_IFMT),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, S_IFDIR, 2),
+ /* no entry by default, if any error */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, ENOENT),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+
+ /* specify an option, if any */
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, LANDLOCK_FLAG_OPT_REVERSE),
+ /* handles to compare with */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, map_fs),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR),
+ /* hook argument) */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct
+ landlock_data, args[0])),
+ /* checker function */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath),
+ /* if one handle is not beneath the checked path */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, ENOENT),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FILE_OPEN,
+ .bpf = hook_file,
+ .size = sizeof(hook_file),
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FILE_PERMISSION,
+ .bpf = hook_file,
+ .size = sizeof(hook_file),
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = LANDLOCK_HOOK_MMAP_FILE,
+ .bpf = hook_file,
+ .size = sizeof(hook_file),
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = LANDLOCK_HOOK_INODE_PERMISSION,
+ .bpf = hook_inode,
+ .size = sizeof(hook_inode),
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = LANDLOCK_HOOK_INODE_GETATTR,
+ .bpf = hook_stat,
+ .size = sizeof(hook_stat),
+ },
+ };
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rules) && !ret; i++) {
+ int bpf0 = landlock_prog_load(rules[i].bpf, rules[i].size, rules[i].hook, 0);
+ if (bpf0 == -1) {
+ perror("prog_load");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", bpf_log_buf);
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!cgroup_nb) {
+ if (seccomp(SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE, 0, &bpf0)) {
+ perror("seccomp(set_hook)");
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (key = 0; key < cgroup_nb && !ret; key++) {
+ int fd = open(cgroup_paths[key],
+ O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "open(cgroup: \"%s\"): %s\n",
+ cgroup_paths[key], strerror(errno));
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (bpf_prog_attach(bpf0, fd, BPF_CGROUP_LANDLOCK)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "bpf_prog_attach(cgroup: \"%s\"): %s\n",
+ cgroup_paths[key], strerror(errno));
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+ close(bpf0);
+ }
+
+ if (path_nb) {
+ close(map_fs);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define ENV_FS_PATH_NAME "LANDLOCK_ALLOWED"
+#define ENV_CGROUP_PATH_NAME "LANDLOCK_CGROUPS"
+#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
+
+static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***path_list)
+{
+ int i, path_nb = 0;
+
+ if (env_path) {
+ path_nb++;
+ for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) {
+ if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0]) {
+ path_nb++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ *path_list = malloc(path_nb * sizeof(**path_list));
+ for (i = 0; i < path_nb; i++) {
+ (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN);
+ }
+
+ return path_nb;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char * const argv[], char * const *envp)
+{
+ char *cmd_path;
+ char *env_path_allowed, *env_path_cgroup;
+ int path_nb, cgroup_nb;
+ const char **sb_paths = NULL;
+ const char **cg_paths = NULL;
+ char * const *cmd_argv;
+
+ env_path_allowed = getenv(ENV_FS_PATH_NAME);
+ if (env_path_allowed)
+ env_path_allowed = strdup(env_path_allowed);
+ env_path_cgroup = getenv(ENV_CGROUP_PATH_NAME);
+ if (env_path_cgroup)
+ env_path_cgroup = strdup(env_path_cgroup);
+
+ path_nb = parse_path(env_path_allowed, &sb_paths);
+ cgroup_nb = parse_path(env_path_cgroup, &cg_paths);
+ if (argc < 2 && !cgroup_nb) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n", argv[0]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, each separated by a colon:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "* %s (whitelist of allowed files and directories)\n",
+ ENV_FS_PATH_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr, "* %s (optional cgroup paths for which the sandbox is enabled)\n",
+ ENV_CGROUP_PATH_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n%s='/bin:/lib:/lib64:/usr:/tmp:/proc/self/fd/0' %s /bin/sh -i\n",
+ ENV_FS_PATH_NAME, argv[0]);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (apply_sandbox(sb_paths, path_nb, cg_paths, cgroup_nb))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cgroup_nb) {
+ cmd_path = argv[1];
+ cmd_argv = argv + 1;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Launching a new sandboxed process.\n");
+ execve(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
+ perror("execve");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Ready to sandbox with cgroups.\n");
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.9.3
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