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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+tXen6uop_MJ0hCZ_QpB17g1TEU2T5h9CPFxfTWJ_ZCw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 19:29:25 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org> Subject: Re: Re: Self introduction On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 5:29 PM, David Windsor <dave@...gbits.org> wrote: > Hi, > > > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 1:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: >> >> On Sun, Sep 11, 2016 at 11:53 PM, AKASHI Takahiro >> <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org> wrote: >> > Hi Kees and all, >> >> Hi! Sorry for not replying sooner -- this email seemed to strangely >> not make its way into the kernel-hardening list, even though it looks >> from the headers like you sent it there. Regardless, on to my late >> reply... >> >> > I'm looking for any tasks that I could contribute in >> > kernel-hardening areas. As I'm working for Linaro, >> > arm/arm64-related items (or arch-specific implementation >> > of more generic features) would be better fitted, but I'm >> > open to broader topics, including complementary tasks >> > for other guys. >> >> Awesome! Yeah, it'll be great to have you helping. Are there any areas >> you especially enjoy working on? >> >> > Do you have any suggestions about such items for me >> > to start small (or can be even big :) with? >> >> I think a great area would be looking at arm and arm64 support for >> catching atomic_t wrap-around. This kind of protection would have >> stopped many of the public attacks from last year, since accidents >> with refcounting on atomic_t tend to be a precursor to use-after-free >> vulnerabilities. >> >> This idea has been implemented in PaX/Grsecurity for a while now as >> PAX_REFCOUNT. An earlier effort to extract it was started but he ran >> out of time to work on it. > > > Sorry about not communicating better about this. I started working on v3 > (porting to linux-next) a few days ago and have the code moved, but still > have to work through a few compile issues. > > If you're interested in helping, take a look: > > https://github.com/dwindsor/linux-next/tree/strict-refcount-v3 > > I'll continue working through this, but help would certainly be appreciated. No worries, thanks for the heads-up! I think getting everyone on the same page will be good. We can all compare notes when Intel posts patches too. -Kees -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
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