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Message-ID: <cbf298aa-6c4c-9a72-fbe0-f4b862bd838f@suse.cz>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:40:54 +0200
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init
On 09/14/2016, 06:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Correct, this is a continuing effort to reduce the internal attack
> surface of the kernel, where one of the most common exploitation
> methods is overwriting function pointers.
>
> Some examples of attacks and mitigations are here:
> http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Exploit_Methods/Function_pointer_overwrite
>
> While this patch isn't a huge change, it's still a viable candidate. I
> send these as I notice them, and hope that other folks will start to
> see these opportunities and send more patches too. :)
I didn't object to the patch. I could imagine the use case. But putting
the idea to the commit message would have made it clear.
thanks,
--
js
suse labs
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