|
Message-ID: <20160909163116.GA10792@leverpostej> Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 17:31:16 +0100 From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>, Julien Grall <julien.grall@....com>, James Morse <james.morse@....com>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 01:51:24PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 04:20:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:02 AM, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> wrote: > > > This is the second version of the arm64 PAN emulation by disabling > > > TTBR0_EL1 accesses. The major change from v1 is the use of a thread_info > > > member to store the real TTBR0_EL1 value. The advantage is slightly > > > simpler assembler macros for uaccess_enable with the downside that > > > switch_mm() must always update the saved ttbr0 even if there is no mm > > > switch. > > > > Is arm64 thread_info attached to the kernel stack? (i.e. is this > > introducing a valuable target for stack-based attacks?) > > Currently yes, thread_info is on the kernel stack. At some point we'll > decouple it in a similar way to what x86 are doing/planning. FWIW, I'm currently working on this (atop of Andy's x86 patches). The IRQ stack work largely removed out dependence on the stack pointer to find thread_info, and I have a plan for the remaining places. There's a fair amount of ground work to do first (e.g. reworking headers to avoid circular dependencies), but hopefully I'll have something that I can share soon. Thanks, Mark.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.