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Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612B41B70283@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2016 10:39:04 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
CC: "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, "keescook@...omium.org"
<keescook@...omium.org>, "spender@...ecurity.net" <spender@...ecurity.net>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Schaufler, Casey"
<casey.schaufler@...el.com>, "Leibowitz, Michael"
<michael.leibowitz@...el.com>, "Roberts, William C"
<william.c.roberts@...el.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC] [PATCH 4/5] invoke path_chroot() LSM
hook on mntns_install()
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:34:39AM +0300, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> This adds an additional invocation of the security_path_chroot LSM
> hook inside mntns_install().
> Currently only capabilities are checked at this point, while process
> root actually changes.
>Are you aware that unprivileged user namespace creation doesn't work in a
chrooted process? See the invocation of current_chrooted() in
create_user_ns(). This means that for this new LSM hook to make any sense, a
namespace admin has to attempt >to sandbox himself with chroot().
I am not sure I understand you fully here. It is possible to create new
mount namespace without creating new user namespace, and when this happens,
if I understand the code right, there is no check like current_chrooted() or
smth like this.
So, how does it relate to user namespace?
>If the current namespace is the init namespace, the process has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init namespace, meaning that filesystem sandboxing is
probably useless.
>If the current namespace is not the init namespace, the process probably
used namespaces to sandbox itself, in which case it wouldn't be using chroot
in the first place,
Why? It is possible that we might be running in the namespace some daemon
which just uses chroot by default (legacy or whatever). I think you even
proposed that in another email.
>r it is running in a container with admin privileges.
>In the latter case, this mitigation miiight make a difference, I'm not sure
exactly how powerful the APIs for namespace admins are - but a mitigation
that only makes a difference inside containers would be weird anyway.
>So: What is your specific usecase here?
The usecase was similar to the unshare cases: we need to find places where
current process's root changes in the code and make sure we catch this
change in order to have the up-to-date information about each process's
root.
So, if we have a process that was put into chroot, but then also creates a
mount ns inside? If we recorded the dentry of chrooted process , but then
not update it upon mount ns creation, we might end up with wrong entry and
all kinds of problems around it.
But yes, the whole relationship with namespaces is tricky and there are sooo
many edge cases. I will try to create a list of possible combinations and
use cases. It is true that this hardening LSM has a particular set of
use-cases in mind and there is no need to support all possible combinations.
I haven't even tested this at all with namespaces yet, which would be
separate fun on its own...
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