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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKpJwurH5wgsMmaWC4mZLFTRLTT_r4ny3iohSBS2WUDEw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 21:44:27 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, linux-mm@...r.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@....linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@...ux-mips.org>, "benh@...nel.crashing.org" <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>, Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>, Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...roid.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC patch 1/6] random: Simplify API for random address requests
On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net> wrote:
> To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
> check for a zero return value. For the current callers, the only way
> to get zero returned is if end <= start. Since they are all adding a
> constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
>
> We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do
> just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start +
> range].
>
> While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/. No current call
> site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
> requests are < MAX_UINT. However, we should match caller expectations
> to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++-------------
> include/linux/random.h | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 0158d3bff7e5..1251cb2cbab2 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1822,22 +1822,13 @@ unsigned long get_random_long(void)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
>
> /*
> - * randomize_range() returns a start address such that
> - *
> - * [...... <range> .....]
> - * start end
> - *
> - * a <range> with size "len" starting at the return value is inside in the
> - * area defined by [start, end], but is otherwise randomized.
> + * randomize_addr() returns a page aligned address within [start, start +
> + * range]
> */
> unsigned long
> -randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
> +randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
Also, this series isn't bisectable since randomize_range gets removed
here before the callers are updated. Perhaps add a macro that calls
randomize_addr with a BUG_ON for len != 0? (And then remove it in the
last patch?)
-Kees
> {
> - unsigned long range = end - len - start;
> -
> - if (end <= start + len)
> - return 0;
> - return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
> + return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_long() % range + start);
> }
>
> /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index e47e533742b5..1ad877a98186 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
>
> unsigned int get_random_int(void);
> unsigned long get_random_long(void);
> -unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len);
> +unsigned long randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
>
> u32 prandom_u32(void);
> void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
> --
> 2.9.2
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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