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Message-ID: <CALCETrXVtjPQHx2g_O3HRr-DNLWRpDL3Pftt2peoVrfNGiSucA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2016 08:54:19 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> To: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 15/29] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 11:01 AM, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com> wrote: >>> On Sun, Jun 26, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote: >>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 >>>> /* Runs on IST stack */ >>>> dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) >>>> { >>>> static const char str[] = "double fault"; >>>> struct task_struct *tsk = current; >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK >>>> + unsigned long cr2; >>>> +#endif >>>> >>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 >>>> extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[]; >>>> @@ -332,6 +350,20 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) >>>> tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; >>>> tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF; >>>> >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK >>>> + /* >>>> + * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail >>>> + * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. CR2 will contain >>>> + * the linear address of the second fault, which will be in the >>>> + * guard page below the bottom of the stack. >>>> + */ >>>> + cr2 = read_cr2(); >>>> + if ((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) >>>> + handle_stack_overflow( >>>> + "kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", >>>> + regs, cr2); >>>> +#endif >>> >>> Is there any other way to tell if this was from a page fault? If it >>> wasn't a page fault then CR2 is undefined. >> >> I guess it doesn't really matter, since the fault is fatal either way. >> The error message might be incorrect though. >> > > It's at least worth a comment, though. Maybe I should check if > regs->rsp is within 40 bytes of the bottom of the stack, too, such > that delivery of an inner fault would have double-faulted assuming the > inner fault didn't use an IST vector. > How about: /* * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. CR2 will contain * the linear address of the second fault, which will be in the * guard page below the bottom of the stack. * * We're limited to using heuristics here, since the CPU does * not tell us what type of fault failed and, if the first fault * wasn't a page fault, CR2 may contain stale garbage. To mostly * rule out garbage, we check if the saved RSP is close enough to * the bottom of the stack to cause exception delivery to fail. * The worst case is 7 stack slots: one for alignment, five for * SS..RIP, and one for the error code. */ tsk_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk); if (regs->rsp <= tsk_stack + 7*8 && regs->rsp > tsk_stack - PAGE_SIZE) { /* A double-fault due to #PF delivery failure is plausible. */ cr2 = read_cr2(); if (tsk_stack - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) handle_stack_overflow( "kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", regs, cr2); } --Andy -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
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