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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLQ9QzncM5PSYs49GqUDAqg7drTm9BT+k4c7XoDTQeVFA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 13:59:29 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> wrote: > On Fri, 2016-06-24 at 13:53 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 12:44 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> >> wrote: >> > >> > v2 of yesterday's patch, this one seems to completely work on my >> > system, after taking _bdata & _edata into account. >> > >> > I am still looking into CMA, but am leaning towards doing that as >> > a follow-up patch. >> > >> > ---8<--- >> > >> > Subject: mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages >> > >> > A single copy_from_user or copy_to_user should go to or from a >> > single >> > kernel object. Inside the slab, or on the stack, we can track the >> > individual objects. >> > >> > For the general kernel heap, we do not know exactly where each >> > object >> > is, but we can tell whether the whole range from ptr to ptr + n is >> > inside the same page, or inside the same compound page. >> > >> > If the start and end of the "object" are in pages that were not >> > allocated >> > together, we are likely dealing with an overflow from one object >> > into >> > the next page, and should disallow this copy. >> > >> > Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> >> > --- >> > v2: >> > - also test against _bdata & _edata, this appears to be necessary >> > for >> > some kernfs/sysfs stuff >> > - clean up the code a little bit >> > >> > mm/usercopy.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> > >> > diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c >> > index e09c33070759..78869ea73194 100644 >> > --- a/mm/usercopy.c >> > +++ b/mm/usercopy.c >> > @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static inline bool >> > check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n) >> > >> > static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, >> > unsigned long n) >> > { >> > - struct page *page; >> > + struct page *page, *endpage; >> > + const void *end = ptr + n - 1; >> > >> > if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr)) >> > return "<null>"; >> > @@ -118,11 +119,29 @@ static inline const char >> > *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n) >> > return NULL; >> > >> > page = virt_to_head_page(ptr); >> > - if (!PageSlab(page)) >> > + if (PageSlab(page)) >> > + /* Check allocator for flags and size. */ >> > + return __check_heap_object(ptr, n, page); >> > + >> > + /* Is the object wholly within one base page? */ >> > + if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) >> > == >> > + ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned >> > long)PAGE_MASK))) >> > + return NULL; >> > + >> > + /* Are the start and end inside the same compound page? */ >> > + endpage = virt_to_head_page(end); >> > + if (likely(endpage == page)) >> > + return NULL; >> > + >> > + /* Is this a special area, eg. .rodata, .bss, or device >> > memory? */ >> > + if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void >> > *)_edata) >> > + return NULL; >> > + >> > + if (PageReserved(page) && PageReserved(endpage)) >> > return NULL; >> Shouldn't PageReserved cover the .data, .rodata, and .bss areas >> already? Is the concern for the check being added here that a copy >> might span multiple pages and that they're not allocated together >> when >> laying out the kernel data regions? > > Having just the PageReserved check was not enough, I had > to specifically add the _sdata & _edata test to get things > to work. > > It looks like PageReserved is simply not set in some cases, > perhaps we are mapping those kernel sections with huge pages, > but not setting up the compound page stuff for the backing > pages, since they never pass through the buddy allocator? Ah-ha, gotcha. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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