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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+hsPcrCAEcY-s9EDDUVqWOhpdx5iGNTBRqCqkExOJh5w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 12:04:32 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>, Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@...il.com>, Alexander Popov <alpopov@...ecurity.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@...el.com>,
Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...e.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9]
x86/mm: memory area address KASLR"
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 9:02 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net> wrote:
> Thomas,
>
> Sorry for wandering off the topic of your series. The big take away for
> me is that you and Kees are concerned about x86 systems pre-RDRAND.
> Just as I'm concerned about deployed embedded systems without bootloader
> support for hw-rngs and so forth.
>
> Whatever final form the approach takes for ARM/dt, I'll make sure we can
> extend it to legacy x86 systems.
Yeah, this seems like a productive conversation to me. :)
> Ard,
>
> On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 12:54:01PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 24 June 2016 at 03:11, Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 10:05:53PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> ...
>> >> On arm64, only DT is used for KASLR (even when booting via ACPI). My
>> >> first draft used register x1, but this turned out to be too much of a
>> >> hassle, since parsing the DT is also necessary to discover whether
>> >> there is a 'nokaslr' argument on the kernel command line. So the
>> >> current implementation only supports a single method, which is the
>> >> /chosen/kaslr-seed uint64 property.
>> >
>> > Ok, just to clarify (after a short offline chat), my goal is to set a
>> > userspace,random-seed <addr, len> property in the device tree once.
>> > The bootloader scripts would also only need to be altered once.
>> >
>> > Then, at each boot, the bootloader reads the entirety of
>> > /var/lib/misc/random-seed (512 bytes) into the configured address.
>> > random-seed could be in /boot, or on a flash partition.
>> >
>> > The decompressor would consume a small portion of that seed for kaslr
>> > and such. After that, the rest would be consumed by random.c to
>> > initialize the entropy pools.
>> >
>>
>> I see. This indeed has little to do with the arm64 KASLR case, other
>> than that they both use a DT property.
>>
>> In the arm64 KASLR case, I deliberately chose to leave it up to the
>> bootloader/firmware to roll the dice, for the same reason you pointed
>> out, i.e., that there is no architected way on ARM to obtain random
>> bits. So in that sense, what you are doing is complimentary to my
>> work, and a KASLR aware arm64 bootloader would copy some of its
>> random bits taken from /var/lib/misc/random-seed into the
>> /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property.
>
> Here I disagree. We have two distinct entropy sources; the hw-rng
> currently feeding kaslr via the /chosen/kaslr-seed property, and the
> seasoned userspace seed I propose handed in via an extra property.
>
> Having the bootloader conflate those two sources as if they are equal
> seems to muddy the waters. I prefer to have bootloaders tell me where
> they got the data rather than to hope the bootloader sourced and mixed
> it well.
>
>> Note that, at the moment, this DT property is only an internal
>> contract between the kernel's UEFI stub and the kernel proper, so we
>> could still easily change that if necessary.
>
> Ideally, I'd prefer to be deliberate with the DT properties, e.g.
>
> random-seed,hwrng <--- bootloader reads from hw-rng
> random-seed,userspace <--- bootloader reads file from us to addr
>
> The kernel decompressor can init kaslr with only one of the two
> properties populated. If both properties are present, then the
> decompressor can extract a u64 from userspace-seed and mix it with
> hwrng-seed before use.
>
> The small devicetree portion of my brain feels like 'kaslr-seed' is
> telling the OS what to do with the value. Whereas devicetree is
> supposed to be describing the hardware. Or, in this case, describing
> the source of the data.
>
> Given that more entropy from more sources is useful for random.c a bit
> later in the boot process, it might be worth making hwrng-seed larger
> than u64 as well. This way we can potentially seed random.c from two
> sources *before* init even starts. Without having to depend on the
> kernel's hw-rng driver being probed. After all, it might not have been
> built, or it could be a module that's loaded later.
>
> I've attached a draft patch to chosen.txt.
>
> thx,
>
> Jason.
>
>
> --------------->8---------------------------------
> diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt
> index 6ae9d82d4c37..61f15f04bc0a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt
> @@ -45,6 +45,52 @@ on PowerPC "stdout" if "stdout-path" is not found. However, the
> "linux,stdout-path" and "stdout" properties are deprecated. New platforms
> should only use the "stdout-path" property.
>
> +random-seed properties
> +----------------------
> +
> +The goal of these properties are to provide an entropy seed early in the boot
> +process. Typically, this is needed by the kernel decompressor for
> +initializing KASLR. At that point, the kernel entropy pools haven't been
> +initialized yet, and any hardware rng drivers haven't been loaded yet, if they
> +exist.
> +
> +The bootloader can attain these seeds and pass them to the kernel via the
> +respective properties. The bootloader is not expected to mix or condition
> +this data in any way, simply read and pass. Either one or both properties can
> +be set if the data is available.
> +
> +random-seed,hwrng property
> +--------------------------
> +
> +For bootloaders with support for reading from the system's hardware random
> +number generator. The bootloader can read a chunk of data from the hw-rng
> +and set it as the value for this binary blob property.
As in the boot loader would change the value per-boot?
Does this proposal include replacing /chosen/kaslr-seed with
random-seed,hwrng? (Should the "chosen" path be used for hwrng too?)
> +
> +/ {
> + chosen {
> + random-seed,hwrng = <0x1f 0x07 0x4d 0x91 ...>;
> + };
> +};
> +
> +random-seed,userspace property
> +------------------------------
> +
> +The goal of this property is to also provide backwards compatibility with
> +existing systems. The bootloaders on these deployed systems typically lack
> +the ability to edit a devicetree or read from an hwrng. The only requirement
> +for a bootloader is that it be able to read a seed file generated by the
> +previous boot into a pre-determined physical address and size. This is
> +typically done via boot scripting.
What happens on a cold boot?
> +
> +This property can then be set in the devicetree statically and parsed by a
> +modern kernel without requiring a bootloader update.
> +
> +/ {
> + chosen {
> + random-seed,userspace = <0x40000 0x200>;
> + };
> +};
> +
> linux,booted-from-kexec
> -----------------------
>
I'm a DT newbie still, so please ignore me if I'm not making useful comments. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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