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Message-ID: <3742830.xcm4l8nxyl@wuerfel> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 21:44:13 +0200 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support On Tuesday, June 21, 2016 2:32:28 PM CEST Rik van Riel wrote: > On Tue, 2016-06-21 at 10:13 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 9:59 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net > > > wrote: > > > > > > I'm tempted to explicitly disallow VM_NO_GUARD in the vmalloc > > > range. > > > It has no in-tree users for non-fixed addresses right now. > > What about the lack of pre-range guard page? That seems like a > > critical feature for this. > > If VM_NO_GUARD is disallowed, and every vmalloc area has > a guard area behind it, then every subsequent vmalloc area > will have a guard page ahead of it. > > I think disallowing VM_NO_GUARD will be all that is required. > > The only thing we may want to verify on the architectures that > we care about is that there is nothing mapped immediately before > the start of the vmalloc range, otherwise the first vmalloced > area will not have a guard page below it. FWIW, ARM has an 8MB guard area between the linear mapping of physical memory and the start of the vmalloc area. I have not checked any of the other architectures though. Arnd
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