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Message-ID: <CALCETrWLAS4sSmN4ejVhK3vDsqNEQEh3RU5ps1iXtAoighaYsw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 10:28:05 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 10:13 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 9:59 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 12:30 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 1:43 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>>>> If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, kernel stacks are allocated with
>>>> vmalloc_node.
>>> [...]
>>>> static struct thread_info *alloc_thread_info_node(struct task_struct *tsk,
>>>> int node)
>>>> {
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>>> + struct thread_info *ti = __vmalloc_node_range(
>>>> + THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END,
>>>> + THREADINFO_GFP | __GFP_HIGHMEM, PAGE_KERNEL,
>>>> + 0, node, __builtin_return_address(0));
>>>> +
>>>
>>> After spender gave some hints on IRC about the guard pages not working
>>> reliably, I decided to have a closer look at this. As far as I can
>>> tell, the idea is that __vmalloc_node_range() automatically adds guard
>>> pages unless the VM_NO_GUARD flag is specified. However, those guard
>>> pages are *behind* allocations, not in front of them, while a stack
>>> guard primarily needs to be in front of the allocation. This wouldn't
>>> matter if all allocations in the vmalloc area had guard pages behind
>>> them, but if someone first does some data allocation with VM_NO_GUARD
>>> and then a stack allocation directly behind that, there won't be a
>>> guard between the data allocation and the stack allocation.
>>
>> I'm tempted to explicitly disallow VM_NO_GUARD in the vmalloc range.
>> It has no in-tree users for non-fixed addresses right now.
>
> What about the lack of pre-range guard page? That seems like a
> critical feature for this. :)
>
Agreed. There's a big va hole there on x86_64, but I don't know about
other arches. It might pay to add something to the vmalloc core code.
Any volunteers?
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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