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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJaWxcOKLtXG3r1XWE8NpL=GFSZwmV_UYjjv6q0135ETQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 10:16:21 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 2:24 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> wrote: > On Monday, June 20, 2016 4:43:30 PM CEST Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> On my laptop, this adds about 1.5µs of overhead to task creation, >> which seems to be mainly caused by vmalloc inefficiently allocating >> individual pages even when a higher-order page is available on the >> freelist. > > Would it help to have a fixed virtual address for the stack instead > and map the current stack to that during a task switch, similar to > how we handle fixmap pages? > > That would of course trade the allocation overhead for a task switch > overhead, which may be better or worse. It would also give "current" > a constant address, which may give a small performance advantage > but may also introduce a new attack vector unless we randomize it > again. Right: we don't want a fixed address. That makes attacks WAY easier. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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